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WE'RE ALL ORIGINALISTS NOW .. . OR ARE
WE?: BOSTOCK'S MISPERCEIVED QUEST TO
DISTINGUISH TITLE VII'S MEANING FROM THE
PUBLIC'S EXPECTATIONS
Steven Semeraro*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Bostock v. Clayton County,' the modern originalist/textualist
method2 of interpreting statutes triumphed.3 All nine United States
Supreme Court Justices endorsed it. Justice Kagan's prophecy-"we're
all textualists now" 4-had come true. Or had it?
Many originalists were not pleased. Some argued that the majority
6
did not apply the method correctly.5 Others took it harder. Missouri

* Steven Semeraro is a Professor of Law at the Thomas Jefferson School of Law. His
previous work on originalist interpretive methods includes Interpreting the Constitution'sElegant
Specificities, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 547 (2017) and Sweet Land of Property:History, Symbols, Rhetoric,
and Theory Behind the Ordering of the Rights to Liberty and Property in the Constitutional

Lexicon, 60 S.C. L. REV. 1 (2008). The title of this Article takes off on Paul Brest's famous Article
criticizing the search for the original intent of the Constitution's Framers. Paul Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,60 B.U. L. REV. 208 (1980).
1. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
2. Throughout this Article, originalist/originalism and textualist/textualism are used to refer
to the modern originalist/textualist method of statutory interpretation. The individual terms are used
to improve the flow of the text and no difference in meaning is intended when referring to one
rather than the other or both.
3. Although modem originalism/textualism is generally thought to have arisen over the last
thirty years, its basic premise was articulated by Oliver Wendall Holmes. Felix Frankfurter, Some
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 538 (1947) (quoting Holmes, "I
don't care what their intention was. I only want to know what the words mean."); OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 207 (1920) ("We do not inquire what the legislature meant;

we ask only what the statute means."). For a discussion of statutory originalism in the LGBT
context, see Josh Blackman, Statutory Originalism, JOSH BLACKMAN'S BLOG (Feb. 26, 2017),
http://joshblackman.com/blog/2017/02/26/statutory-originalism.
4. Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging OrdinaryMeaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788,
793, n.10 (2018) (quoting Justice Kagan).
5. See, e.g., Josh Blackman & Randy Barnett, Justice Gorsuch's Halfway Textualism
Surprises and Disappoints in the Title VII Cases, NAT'L REV. (June 26, 2020, 6:30 AM),
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Senator Josh Hawley reacted angrily: "[I]f we've been fighting for
originalism and textualism and this is the result .. . we've been fighting
for ... exactly the opposite of what we thought we were fighting for." 7
Nelson Lund declared the case "a demonstrably outlandish judicial
performance." 8 Josh Hammer was even more blunt: "Bostock ... lays
bare the moral and intellectual bankruptcy of the conservative legal
movement," 9 and he didn't mean in a good way.
What happened? In 1964, all agreed neither Congress nor most of
the public would have expected Title VII to prohibit sexual orientation
or gender identity discrimination. 10 For a casual originalist, that would
seem to end the matter. After all, isn't the whole idea to apply the law
the way the public at the time would have understood it, rather than
substitute modern values?
Well yes . .. but it's not that simple." As Lawrence Solum, an
originalist scholar, has explained, original public meaning is not how a
https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/06/justice-gorsuch-title-vii-cases-half-way-textualism-surpris
es-disappoints (contending that the Court did not look to the correct original public meaning);
Nelson Lund, Living Textualism in Bostock v. Clayton County, ORIGINALISM BLOG (July 20, 2020),
https://originalismblog.typepad.com; Ed Whelan, A 'PirateShip' Sailing Undera 'Textualist Flag,'
NAT'L REV. (June 15, 2020, 1:01 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/a-pirateship-sailing-under-a-textualist-flag (agreeing with the Alito dissent); Megan M. Arago & David
Upham, The Blindness of Justice Gorsuch's Woke Textualism, PUB. DISCOURsE (June 22, 2020),

https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2020/06/65296 (accusing the Court of "historical blindness"
and having Congress speak in "tongues" with no one interpreting). Other commentators have
criticized the Bostock opinion on non-originalist grounds. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, The
Mindlessness of Bostock, L. & LIBERTY (July 9, 2020), https:/ilawliberty.org/bostock-mindlessness
(criticizing the originalist/textualist approach on the ground that it "makes the content of our law the
product not of mindful decision-making, but of a sort of semantic accident" and creating the
possibility of surprise in decision-making that the rule of law is intended to inhibit in the name of
following the rule of law); Robert Lowry Clinton, Textual Literalism and Legal Positivism: On
Bostock and the Western Legal Tradition, PUB. DISCOURSE (July 5, 2020),
https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2020/07/66630 (calling for courts to rely on traditional means
of legal interpretation rather than textualism).
6. See, e.g., Josh Blackman, Senator Hawley: Bostock "Represents the End of the
ConservativeLegal Movement," REASON FOUND.: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 16, 2020, 5:39 PM),
https://reason.com/2020/06/16/senator-hawley-bostock-represents-the-end-of-the-conservativelegal-movement.
7. See id.
8. Lund, supra note 5.
9. Jesse Merriam, Legal Conservatism After Bostock, L. & LIBERTY (June 29, 2020),
https://lawliberty.org/legal-conservatism-after-bostock.
10. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737, 1749 (2020); id. at 1757, 1767
(Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 1828-29 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
11. Modern originalism's focus on the public meaning of the text can be contrasted with
earlier versions of originalism that look to the intent of the enacting legislature. In the 1970s and
1980s, Robert Bork and others argued that the original intent of those who drafted the Constitution
should constrain courts. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment

Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 8, 13 (1971) (noting "[t]he words are general but surely that would not
permit us to escape the framers' intent if it were clear"); Raoul Berger, Paul Brest's Brieffor an
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majority of the public would have expected a statute to apply. 12 "[D]irect
reliance on original expected applications," he wrote, is "completely
inconsistent" with the modern originalist/textualist method.13 Instead, an
interpreting court must look to the intersubjectively understood meaning
that the text would convey to an objectively reasonable reader at the time
the legislature enacted the statute.' 4 This reader takes account of the
context of the entire statute and the law more broadly," but they must
filter out the extratextual gloss that any particular person's individuating
values, desires, and prejudices layer on top of the text's intersubjective
semantic meaning. 16
ImperialJudiciary, 40 MD. L. REv. 1, 2, 32 (1981) ("[T]he Court is imposing its own values on the
people, often in defiance of the framers' intentions.... [T]he Court is not empowered to reverse the
unmistakable intention of the Framers."); see also John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 935-36 (1973); Hans A. Linde, Judges, Critics, and
the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 254-55 (1972); Edwin Meese III, Atty. Gen., Speech
Before the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985), reprinted in THE FEDERALIST SOC'Y (1986),
https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publications/the-great-debate-attorney-general-ed-meese-iiijuly-91985. See generally Berger, supra, at 11 (critiquing the Court's use of the Fourteenth Amendment
to effectively amend the Constitution in ways that disregarded the original intent of the founding
fathers as well as the Congress ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment).
The idea for semantic originalism may have arisen with Justice Scalia's speech urging
originalists to move from the concept of intent to the concept of meaning. See Justice Antonin
Scalia, Address Before the Attorney General's Conference on Economic Liberties in Washington,
D.C. (June 14, 1986), in OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A
SOURCEBOOK 101, 103-04, 106 (1987); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism, at

14-18 (Ill. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Rsch. Papers Ser. No. 07-24, Nov. 22, 2008); see generally
Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 599, 599, 607 (2004)
(outlining the historical progression of originalism, comparing old and new methods).
The other principal method for interpreting legal texts, living constitutionalism, takes its

name from the debate over interpretative methods involving the Constitution. It takes account of the
meaning of a law's text and the likely purpose of the legislature that enacted it while also allowing
the interpreter to consider social values that have evolved since the time of the enactment, at least
when the text is not wholly determinative of the result. Knowledge about the world that did not exist
at the time the legislature enacted a law, living constitutionalists believe, can legitimately be applied
by an interpreting court without undermining the Rule of Law. Failing to do so would inhibit the
court's ability to interpret the law to best fulfill its societal function. See Thomas B. Colby & Peter
J. Smith, Living Originalism,59 DUKE L.J. 239, 248-49, 262-64 (2009). Statutory interpretation can
be divided into additional subcategories including textualism, intentionalism, purposivism,
pragmatism, and dynamic interpretation.

12. Solum, supra note 11, at 20.
13. Id.
14. See infra PartII.
15. See infra PartII.
16. See infra Part II. Katie Eyer grappled with this same issue prior to the Court's decision in
Bostock. Articulating the meaning-application distinction, she argued that taking account of what
she called "expected applications originalism" is improper whether focusing on the expectations of
the legislators or the general public. Katie R Eyer, Statutory Originalism and LGBT Rights, 54
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 63, 68-69 (2019) (explaining that "[w]hile proponents of 'statutory
originalism' in the LGBT rights cases have shifted the focus from Congress's expectations [which
the Court had clearly rejected] to those of the general public, they have offered no normative
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Originalists justify this strict textualist focus on the ground that
only the text as understood by an objective reader constitutes law with
legitimate binding power. 7 American governmental structures empower
representatives to enact written statutes that the governed can read and
understand.18 What some people-or even most people-would read
into the text is not the law. 19 As originalist scholar Randy Barnett
explains, citizens cannot read minds, and thus they cannot know the
subjective expectations others have about how a law should apply in
particular cases. 20 Those expectations can evince intersubjective
meaning, but they cannot be law. Only the objective part-the meaning
that all reasonable people would understand from the text-has the
authority to legitimately bind us. 21
Modern originalism/textualism thus rests on dual, potentially
conflicting, tenets. An interpreter, originalists believe, must not
substitute his own values for those existing at the time a law was
enacted. Evolving social movements must seek change through the
democratic process for new law to be legitimate. Anti-democratic courts
have no authority to update a statute to suit modern values.
At the same time, the interpreter must exclude from the interpretive
process the individuating values that particular people at the time of
enactment read into the statute. What anyone subjectively anticipated is
not legitimate binding law, whether the expectations are those of a
legislator, a citizen reading the law as it is being enacted, or an
interpreting judge.
The
in sharp relief.
Bostock puts this contradiction
originalist/textualist method commands the interpreter to both (1) set

argument for why the result ought to differ based on the identity of the group whose subjective
expectations are the focus of inquiry"). See infra Part III.B.4.b.i for an argument that prevailing
views of the public differ from legislative expectations in important, if not determinative, ways. In
Eyer's view, the "original public meaning" concept should be rejected, and an interpreting court
should refer only to the literal meaning of the terms of the statute both because that is what the
Court has done in recent statutory interpretation cases and because doing so leads to the normatively
correct result. Eyer, supra, at 96-98, 103. That position has been foreclosed by the Court's decision
in Bostock because the majority did purport to rely on the original public meaning of Title VII.
Accommodating text and anticipated applications have thus become critical.
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. See infra Part II.B.
19. See infra Part II.B.
20.

RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF

LIBERTY 105 (rev. ed. 2014) (analogizing to contract law in explaining originalism) ("Because
people cannot read each other's minds, they must rely on appearances when making their decision

of whether to enter or to refrain from entering into a contractual relationship. ... [W]e are
concerned about the intentions of the parties, [but] only those intentions the parties have succeeded
in manifesting to each other, and not with any uncommunicated subjective intentions.").
21. See infra Part I.B.
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aside the 1964 public's extratextual prejudice against gay and
and (2) implement the midcentury
transgender individuals;
understanding prevailing when Congress enacted Title VII, not the
values we hold today. The mid-1960s public's expectations about how
Title VII would apply to sexual orientation and gender identity
discrimination is thus both (1) irrelevant to the original public meaning,
and (2) so sacrosanct that an interpreting court must apply it no matter
how horribly wrong the prevailing views of that period were.
Rather than grapple with this contradiction, the majority and the
dissents privilege one tenet or the other. The widely held belief that Title
VII did not protect gay or transgender persons, Justice Gorsuch
explained, was merely an extratextual anticipated non-application
infected by the prejudices of the time. 22 It was not the statute's original
public meaning. 23 A reasonable person in 1964-who focused on the
semantic meaning of the phrase discrimination because of sex in the
context of Title VII and the law more broadly, but without the
extratextual prejudice-would have recognized that the law covered
sexual orientation and gender identity. 24 For the majority, this holding
simply distilled the objective component of the law from the text.25
Justices Alito and Kavanaugh privileged originalism's other tenet,
concluding that the majority substituted modern understandings for those
of the generation that enacted the law. 26 To avoid reliance on the judges'
own values, the dissenters insisted, an interpreting court must take
account of the original prevailing view when Congress enacted the
statute. 27
Despite a great deal of thrust and parry between the Justices, their
opinions never engaged the core disagreement over how an interpreting
court should distinguish intersubjective original public meaning from
individuating subjective expectations about how to apply the statute. 28

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1749-51 (2020).
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.A.
See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738-41.
Id. at 1756, 1761 (Auto, J., dissenting); id. at 1834 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
See infra IIL.B.4.
The initial reaction from the originalist community has also not focused on the

meaning-expectations issue. See William Baude, Conservatives, Don't Give Up on Your Principles
or
the
Supreme
Court,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
9,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/09/opinion/supreme-court-originalism-conservatism.html

(recognizing that Bostock "revealed debates among the originalists-for instance, how to balance a
conflict between the apparently plain meaning of the text and the expectations of the people who
wrote it" but not engaging the issue and recognizing that "many . .. originalists have found Justice
Gorsuch's arguments to be a stretch"). Instead, originalists criticized the Court for failing to take

account of the correct historical materials. See Blackman & Barnett, supra note 5 (noting that the
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This issue goes to the heart of originalism and demands more attention.
Originalist scholars reference the issue, 2 9 but their theoretical analysis
does not resolve concrete cases in which an interpreting court tries to
avoid imposing modern values while simultaneously refraining from
illegitimately converting then prevailing subjective desires and
prejudices into binding law.
Two methods could potentially enable originalism/textualism to
resolve this internal conflict. First, Justice Kavanaugh's use of linguistic
categories can be read as an attempt to resolve the conflict by using how
we talk as a stand-in for objective meaning. This approach fails.
Although the existence of linguistic categories is objective, the
categories arise subjectively. Allowing the way people talk to blur the
meaning of a clear text would undermine both of originalism's tenets by
allowing modern judges to (1) change the meaning of objective text,
perhaps to conform to their own values, by selecting among linguistic
categories; and (2) imbue extratextual subjective beliefs held only by
some with the authority to bind future generations.
Second, and more promising, originalist scholars have provided
hypotheticals in which an interpreting court could legitimately take
account of modern learning.3 0 If the original populace made a mistake of
objective fact, originalists have acknowledged, a court may correct that
mistake when interpreting the text's original meaning.3 ' But this window
to modern learning is strictly limited. It only applies to factual errors. An
interpreter may not consider changes in the policies that people believe
best advance societal interests.32 Since the relevant changes in Bostock
between 1964 and today relate to our subjective views about
homosexuality and gender identity, rather than factual errors, originalists
appear to have concluded that the interpretive window to modern
learning should have remained closed.33
Aspects of language theory show, however, that changes in
values-at least in cases like Bostock-can be indistinguishable from
mistakes of fact.34 No hard break separates these categories for us.
Whether a particular issue is designated as one of fact or value is a
choice we make. Not all disputes that we call factual can be resolved
then current meaning of discrimination against included a component of bias or prejudice); Arago
& Upham, supranote 5 (explaining that sex discrimination in 1964 did not mean that all traditional
sex-based distinctions must be barred).
29. See infra Part IL.D.
30. See infra Part Iv.C.
31. See infra Part IV.C.
32. See infra Part IV.C.
33. See, e.g., Blackman, supra note 6; see also infra Part IV.
34. See Blackman, supra note 6.
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definitively. Yet, we can agree that certain concepts that we call values
are true with an extremely high degree of consensus. Whether an
interpreting court should take account of modern learning should turn on
the definitiveness of the mistaken nature of the public's original
expectations, not whether a mistake is delineated as one of fact or value.
To be sure, close cases will pose interpretive challenges over the
definitiveness of the mistake. But such challenges are nothing new, and
Bostock is not a close case.
Part II describes the originalist/textualist method, focusing on the
distinction between public meaning and anticipated applications. Part III
provides a roadmap to the Bostock Court's opinions about how to
properly apply the originalist/textualist method to the cases before it. For
each principal ground on which the dissenters disputed the majority, this
Part assesses the Justices' claims through originalism's prism. Part IV
considers how the originalist/textualist method can be applied in cases
like Bostock where an extratextual prevailing prejudice that defined the
original understanding of the law has definitively changed. It concludes
that for original public meaning to guide the interpreter, judges must
strive to make the right decision, not merely to find it.
II.

DISTINGUISHING PUBLIC MEANING FROM EXPECTED
APPLICATIONS

Modern originalists/textualists look to a statute's meaning at the
time a legislature enacts it.35 But meaning comes in different flavors. A
court interpreting a statute must look to the public meaning, i.e., a
reasonable reader's intersubjective understanding of the relevant clause
in the context of the entire statute and American law more generally.
The legislature's or citizens' subjective expectations about how the
statute would apply, by contrast, are not part of its original public
meaning and thus are not binding law. 36
37
All nine Justices deciding Bostock purported to apply this method.
Yet, they interpreted the text in diametrically opposite ways because
they took different approaches to distinguish meaning from expectations.
This Part reviews the originalist method, focusing on this distinction.

35.
36.

See infra Part II.A.
Hillel Y. Levin, Contemporary Meaning and Expectations in Statutory Interpretation,

2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1103, 1108-09, 1114-15, 1117 (2012).
37. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738-41 (2020); id. at 1766-67, 1771-72
(Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 1825, 1828, 1833 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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Original Public Meaning

Originalism's central claim, Solum explains, is that a legal text
describes "rules with content that are fixed by the original public
meaning of the text-the conventional semantic meaning of the words
and phrases in context." 38 For an originalist, semantic meaning refers to
a discoverable, fixed, intersubjective understanding that any reasonable
contemporary reader who knows the statute's context, and generally
understands the American legal system, would have assigned to the
text.39
Semantic meaning contrasts with the purpose to which the drafters
thought the statute would be put-the teleological meaning-or how
people reading a law would assume its text would apply to specific
cases-the applicative meaning.40 These types of meaning differ from
semantic meaning because they are subject to reasonable disagreement.
Legislators may differ about a law's purpose, and reasonable readers
will not all agree about how courts should apply the text to particular
cases. These differing views-unlike the semantic original public
meaning-turn on individualizing subjective values, desires, and
prejudices. Only semantic meaning is intersubjective and thus fixed
across all reasonable readers. And only it, therefore, constitutes
legitimate, binding law.
B.

Justifying the Meaning/Expectation Distinction

Modern originalists privilege a text's objective meaning over the
subjective expectations that individuals glean from it because originalists

38.

Solum, supra note 11, at 2; see also Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24

CONST. COMMENT. 291, 303 (2007) ("[W]e have a written Constitution that is also enforceable law.
We treat the Constitution as law by viewing its text and the principles that underlie the text . ... To

do this we must ask what the people who drafted the text were trying to achieve in choosing the
words they chose, and, where their words presume underlying principles, what principles they
sought to endorse.").
39.

See Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Texting, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 123, 148-51

(2007) (showing that semantic originalists look for meanings which would have been commonly
understood by many at the time of enactment); see also Solum, supra note 11, at 2 (reiterating that
"Semantic Originalism" focuses on content that is "fixed at the time of adoption" and "original
public meaning").
40. See Solum, supra note 11, at 2-3, 64; see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 101, 103-04 (2012) (demonstrating how
inferring meanings can contradict the original law makers' intentions); Victoria F. Nourse, Two
Kinds of Plain Meaning, 76 BROOK. L. REv. 997, 998-99 (2011) (describing Justice Scalia's strong
opposition to statutory interpretation elevating congressional purpose or intent over text); Nicholas
S. Zeppos, The Use ofAuthority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV.

1073, 1078-79 (1992) (distinguishing original public meaning from "asking how the enacting
Congress would have decided the question").
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believe the nature of our law-making system compels it.4' Were a single
individual-a king or emperor-empowered to dictate law, then that
person's subjective view about how it applied would matter to an
interpreter.
But our law does not emanate from a single individual. The
American legal system employs a particular procedure empowering a
legislature to enact a written text.42 Until a future Congress changes the
statutory language on which the legislators agreed, the law's fixed,
intersubjective original meaning-how a reasonable person would have
understood the text in context-constitutes the only legitimate source of
our law.
Beyond that lies only what particular individuals thought about a
particular law. These subjective beliefs are not binding on anyone.
Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash summed up this position
well: "Originalists do not give priority to the plain dictionary meaning of
the ... text because they like grammar more than history. They give
priority to it because they believe that it and it alone is law."43
From this, originalists draw two justifications for their sharp
distinction between intersubjective meaning and subjective expectations.
First, it is compelled by the need to ensure that only legitimate law binds
future conduct.' Second, it inhibits modern interpreters from
illegitimately imparting their own subjective views into the law. 45 The
following Subparts expand on these justifications and reveal their
potential conflict.
1. Defining Legitimate Binding Law
Because legitimate binding law flows from a reasonable citizen's
understanding of the relevant clause in the context of the rest of the
statute and the law in general, the legislator's beliefs about how the

41.

Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President'sPower to Execute the Laws,

104 YALE L.J. 541, 551-52(1994).
42. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1822-24 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (showing how the
procedure of enacting or amending laws is meant to be executed); Calabresi & Prakash, supra note

41, at 551 & n.33.
43. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 41, at 552. The classic debunking of the notion that the
subjective intent of the legislature constituted legitimate binding law is found in an article by Paul
Brest. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204,
221 (1980) ("The act of translation required here [to apply historic values to a present problem] is
different in kind, for it involves the counterfactual and imaginary act of projecting the adopters'
concepts and attitudes into a future they probably could not have envisioned. When the interpreter
engages in this sort of projection, she is in a fantasy world more of her own than of the adopters'

making.").
44. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 20, at 104-07, 109.
45. See, e.g., id. at 111.
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statute would apply are not binding. 46 Those expectations could be
narrower or broader than the semantic meaning conveyed by the text in
context, alterations that would be unknown to reasonable readers. Only
the text-the part the public can access-is the law.
Originalists believe that the objective text generally provides
47
"As
sufficient content to support a robust enforceable meaning.
a
enact
who
those
explained,
Whittington
individuals," originalist Keith
law are "capable of agreeing to a common text with a commonly
understood meaning, and it is this meaning that the originalist hopes to
uncover."48 Justice Scalia put it this way: "We look for a sort of
'objectified intent'-the intent that a reasonable person would gather
from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus
juris .... It is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver." 49
46. Id. at 95 (stating that originalism's sources are "dictionaries, common contemporary
meanings, an analysis of how particular words and phrases are used elsewhere in the document or in
other foundational documents and cases, and logical inferences from the structure and general
purposes of the text"); id. at 107 ("[C]ontextual understanding includes how these words are used
elsewhere in the document and the general purposes for these clauses that can be ascertained from
the document itself.").
47. See id. at 95.
48. KEITH E. wHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, & JUDICIAL REVIEW 164 (1999); Solum, supra note 11, at 2.

49. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
FederalCourts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 17
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); see Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998)
("[I]t is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by
which we are governed.").
Potential non-rule-of-law justifications for originalism have been largely disowned by
leading advocates of this method. For example, originalism might be thought to foster more clarity
and precision than methods that incorporate modern values into the interpretive calculus. But
Whittington has explained that this is not so: "[A]n originalist judge is faced with many of the same
difficulties and temptations that are faced by non-originalist judges.... [Originalism] cannot be
expected to free judges from the exercise of contestable interpretive judgment." WHITTINGTON,

supra note 48, at 4; see also John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A PragmaticDefense of
Originalism, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 383, 383, 389-90 (2007). This is true both because meaning is
often contested and when clear may still be vague and incapable of providing a definitive answer to
a particular question. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 48, at 9-10.
Similarly, originalism does not necessarily foster judicial restraint. Although original
intent scholars made this claim, new originalists generally reject it. See id. at 42-43; BARNETT,
supra note 20, at 270. Whittington explained, "a philosophy of restraint ... may not be consistent
with advocacy of originalism per se." wHITTINGTON, supra note 48, at 44. New originalists thus
acknowledge that courts must enforce not just the clear meaning of the text but the gaps as well. Id.
at 40-41, 44 (explaining that originalism cannot be justified on the ground that courts are not
adequate to decide policy issues or that originalism is uniquely constraining); BARNETT, supra note
20, at 268-69 ("A reliance on judges ... is unavoidable in a constitutional system in which only
courts are available to stand between individual citizens and majority and minority factions
operating through representative government.").
Originalists recognize that uncovering the original public meaning of a legal text will not
necessarily enable a court to determine precisely how that text will apply to a particular case. A key
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"The seeming paradox of determining 'intentions' without relying
on evidence of particular subjective intent," Barnett explains, "is
routinely resolved by the fact that the English language contains words
with generally accepted meanings that are ascertainable independent of
any of our subjective opinions about their meaning." 0 As Whittington
described it, the role of historical evidence in interpreting a legal text is
to show the lawmakers' intent in doing something-enactingcertain text
into law-rather than their intent to do something, what they expected
that law to do. 5' Calabresi and Prakash put it this way: "[W]hen prior
originalist scholarship has looked to history, it has always done so in a
manner consistent with the primacy of the law of the text. Originalists do
not believe that present-day Americans are bound by historical events or
opinions . . .""
"The interpreter," Whittington explained, "is [thus] not seeking to
cross-examine the [lawmakers] about ... what they think of a given
case."53 Indeed, the lawmakers "themselves could be wrong in their
assessment as to the correct application of the rule that
they had established ... . [T]he interpreter [therefore] should not be
misled into incorporating expectations ... into the text."" Those who
draft a statute necessarily and objectively embed certain meaning into
the words they chose, but that meaning "does not depend on whether the
[lawmakers] themselves envisioned ... an application.""
2. Reigning in Modem Interpreters
Scalia described what he called a "practical" benefit flowing from
the meaning-expectation distinction that rendered it consistent with the
fundamental originalist tenet that modern values should not infect the
interpretation process. 56 As he saw it, if expectations were not excluded,

element of semantic originalism is the distinction between interpretation, which solely involves
uncovering the original public meaning, and construction, which involves applying the full array of
legal and policy devices to apply a statute in a way that does not conflict with its original public
meaning. wHITTINGTON, supra note 48, at 7-10; Solum, supra note 11, at 19, 63-66, 69.
50. BARNETT, supra note 20, at 107.
51. wHITTINGTON, supra note 48, at 178; BARNETT, supra note 20, at 105 (explaining that
the originalists rely on objective public meaning "because this is the meaning to which the parties
have committed themselves. This, not any unexpressed intentions, is the meaning they wish to be
preserved.").
52. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 41, at 550.
53.

WHITTINGTON, supra note 48, at 288 n.81.

54. Id. at 187.
55. Id.
56. Scalia, supranote 49, at 17-18.
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modern interpreters would be irresistibly tempted to insert their own
values into the analysis.57
Giving weight to the subjective views of the legislators, for
example, would naturally lead interpreters to assume that those who
enacted a statute would have wanted it to apply in a way that best served
society's interests. And judges would likely conclude that the enactors
shared their own subjective views about how to achieve that goal.
"[U]nder the guise or even the self-delusion of pursuing unexpressed
legislative intents, common-law judges will in fact pursue their own
objectives and desires," 8 or, perhaps, in the current political climate,
interpreting Justices may pursue the objectives and desires of the social
groups they were, in a sense, appointed to represent. 59
As originalists John O. McGinnis and Michael Rappaport have
recognized, excluding expectations from the interpretive calculus could
have the opposite effect of improperly opening the process to modern
values. 60 If the original expectations are walled off, they argue, judges
61
may be tempted to read their own social policy into a vague text.
Giving "[e]xpected applications" significant interpretive weight would
thus be "especially useful [to] caution modern interpreters against
substituting their own preferred glosses on meaning for those that would
have been widely held" when a law was enacted. 62 And therein lies the
conflict. Expectations are not legitimate binding law, but without them,
an interpreting court may be unable to avoid the alluring influence of
modern values.

57. Id.
58. Id. ("When you are told to decide, not on the basis of what the legislature said, but on the
basis of what it meant, .. . your best shot at figuring out what the legislature meant is to ask yourself
what a wise and intelligent person should have meant; and that will surely bring you to the
conclusion that the law means what you think it ought to mean .... ").
59. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1824, 1835-36 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting). At least with respect to Kavanaugh, one could read his dissent to suggest no personal
desire to exclude homosexual and transgender persons from Title VII's scope, but an understanding
that those who supported his nomination wanted him to. Id. at 1822, 1835-37 (chastising the Court
for usurping the legislative process, but then adding, "Notwithstanding my concern about the
Court's transgression of the Constitution's separation of powers, it is appropriate to acknowledge
the important victory achieved today by gay and lesbian Americans.... They have advanced
powerful policy arguments and can take pride in today's result."). As in all matters of this sort, I
acknowledge that I may be seeing what I expect to see.
60. See John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretative Principles as the
Core of Originalism,24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 378-80 (2007).
61. Id. at 379.
62. Id.
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UnclearMeaning and HistoricalEvidence

This potential conflict within originalism has been masked by the
process originalists use to flush out meaning, investigating historical
evidence. Critically, as Whittington recognized, this inquiry must rely on
"intersubjective standards of evaluation." 63 The facts needed to
determine original meaning may not be obvious," but they are facts.
When all the information is in, an interpreter must settle on the meaning
reasonable citizens would have understood, carefully guarding against
the influence of the subjective contestable values that any particular

individual might have held.
To further this goal of separating the objective wheat of
intersubjective meaning from the subjective chaff of individual
expectations, originalists initially eschew historical conduct evidencehow people acted and what they said-in favor of contemporary
dictionary definitions combined with the law's context. 65 Only if the
meaning of the text remains vague or ambiguous after this process
should a court look to conduct evidence. 66
If an originalist must move beyond this core evidence, they follow
an evidentiary hierarchy designed to ensure that the investigation
remains focused on intersubjective facts. 67 First, they look to widely read
public statements appearing during the legislative debate that explain the
law to those who would be governed by it. 68 Only if meaning remains
uncertain should an originalist interpreter consider privately made
69
contemporaneous statements about the meaning of the text. In all
cases, though, the originalist must recognize that public and private
statements are shaped by the author's subjective values, desires, and

63. WHITTINGTON, supra note 48, at 195.
64. Victoria Nourse, Textualism 3.0: Statutory InterpretationAfter Justice Scalia, 70 ALA. L.
REV. 667, 669 n.7 (2019) (identifying cases decided in 2018 by a 5-4 vote in which the majority

and the dissent both purported to apply textualism).
65.

BARNETT, supra note 20, at 95.

66. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 41, at 552-53.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 553. In the area of constitutional interpretation, the Federalist Papers constitute a
quintessential example of this sort of evidence. Even here, though, interpreters must exercise care.
Although reading a Federalist Paper is evidence of how a reasonable reader would have understood
a particular constitutional clause, each essay also embodied the author's subjective belief about how
the Constitution would apply. The former is relevant to the originalist interpreter, the extratextual
gloss provided by the latter is not.
69. Id. In the constitutional context, Madison's notes describing the debates among the

Constitution's drafters would constitute this type of historical evidence. Here, the potential to go off
the originalist rails is greater still. These types of private statements about the law "might be
relevant if, and only if, they reveal something about the original public meaning that the text had to
those who" read the relevant clause contemporaneously with its enactment. Id.
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prejudices, which are not relevant to public meaning. 70 As Solum has
explained, if "knowledge of semantic intentions is necessary to glean
meaning, then adding more text to the stack of things to be interpreted
does not really solve the problem." 7 1
An interpreting court should consider conduct, statements, or
practices occurring after the legislature enacted the law only if the
meaning of the text remains uncertain after considering all the
then-contemporary evidence. 72 "Such [post-enactment] history is the
least reliable source for recovering the original meaning of the law" 73
and thus originalists must exercise utmost care in using it.
In sum, the interpreter properly takes account of historical facts
only to the extent that they reveal the intersubjective meaning embodied
in the text to a reasonable contemporary reader. What history may reveal
about how contemporary values, desires, and prejudices framed any
particular person's view of the text should be as irrelevant to the modern
interpreter as the interpreters' own subjective values. 74 That distinction
is not an easy one to draw. But as Scalia explained, the originalist must
draw it.75 Only the "text" of the statute "is the law," not anyone's
subjective beliefs about how it should apply. 76
D.

an

Using OriginalExpected Applications to Uncover OriginalPublic
Meaning
If public meaning is not clear from dictionary definitions in context,
originalist
inquiry
into
historic
evidence
brings
the

70.
71.
72.
73.
(2002).

Solum, supra note 39, at 149-50.
Id.
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 41, at 553.
Id.; see also Gary Lawson, Delegation and OriginalMeaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 398

74.

See Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism and Its Discontents (Plus a Thought or Two About

Abortion), 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 385-89 (2007) ("[L]eading academic defenders of originalism
have been disavowing expectation originalism for years."); see also Steven G. Calabresi & Gary
Lawson, The Unitary Executive, JurisdictionStripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist
Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1045 (2007) ("The touchstone must always

be the Constitution, not what anyone in particular, including the First Congress, says about the
Constitution."); Michael w. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A
Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "MoralReading" of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269,

1284 (1997) (explaining that "no reputable originalist, with the possible exception of Raoul Berger,
takes the view that the Framers' 'assumptions and expectation about the correct application' of their
principles is controlling").
75. Scalia, supra note 49, at 17.
76. Id. at 22. Some commentators have dismissively labeled statutory interpretation that
focuses on the practices at the time of the enactment rather than the meaning of the text itself as "I
Have No Idea Originalism." Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the Establishment Clause,
103 Nw. U. L. REV. 727, 737 (2009).
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meaning-expectations distinction into sharp relief. Historic statements
and practices necessarily communicate information about both
(1) intersubjective meaning, and (2) the subjective expectations of those
making the statements and engaging in the relevant practices. Precisely
how expectations fit into the interpretive process is probably the fuzziest
aspect of modern originalism/textualism. Scalia recognized that "those
two concepts chase one another back and forth to some extent, since the
import of language depends upon its context, which includes the
occasion for, and hence the evident purpose of, its utterance."7 7
Solum acknowledges that originalists look to expectations as
evidence of public meaning. 78 McGinnis and Rappaport go a step
further, arguing that original expectations are such "strong evidence"
informing "original meaning" that anyone disagreeing must bear the
burden of proving otherwise. 79 Jack Balkin swings in the other direction,
placing a heavy burden on those who would find meaning in
expectations. 80 And Scalia's views oscillate, arguing that excluding
expectations entirely is necessary to obtain the theoretical and practical
benefits of originalism/textualism, 81 while also concluding that original
expectations bind future interpreters. 82

77.

Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 129, 144 (Amy Gutmann

ed., 1997).
78. Solum, supra note 11, at 109.
79. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 60, at 371. McGinnis and Rappaport set up a
dichotomy between looking to expected applications to define meaning and "discarding expected
applications in favor of abstract principles, as influenced by social movements." Id. at 378. This
dichotomy appears to leave out the approach defined by Solum, Whittington, and others that
expectations are excluded because they are subjective. How could a method resting on the objective
meaning of the text rely on subjective and necessarily varying views on how people would
anticipate that a statute would apply, even if those expectations were "widely held"? The authors
write that "[e]xpected applications are especially useful because they caution modern interpreters
against substituting their own preferred glosses on meaning for those that would have been widely
held at the Framing." Id. at 379. But that approach appears to undermine the originalist's search for
intersubjective meaning as the only legitimate law by authorizing interpreters to follow the
subjective values, desires, and prejudices that happened to be widely held when a law is enacted.
The authors acknowledge that expectations "are not always to be followed," but they essentially flip
the burden requiring those who would argue for a meaning inconsistent with widely held
expectations to prove that they do not establish objective meaning. Id. (explaining "the
circumstances must provide strong reasons for believing the applications were mistaken").
80. Balkin, supra note 38, at 303 ("[O]riginal expected application . .. helps us understand
the original meaning of the text and the general principles that animated the text. But it is important
not as binding law but rather as an aid to interpretation, one among many others. It does not
control .... ").
81. Scalia, supra note 49, at 17-18.
82. See id. at 40, 42; Scalia, supra note 77, at 144-45 (explaining that under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause, the founding generation's expectations about what constitutes as cruel
punishment controls).
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Whittington has gone the furthest in addressing the subtleties of the
meaning-expectation distinction. He explained that what lawmakers
"thought the terms meant in using them" is highly relevant to an
interpreting court, but the legislators' expectations about how the statute
would apply are not.8 3 Lawmakers could not be wrong about the former,
but they could be wrong "in their assessment as to the correct application
of the rule that they had established." 84 Whittington adds that "the
interpreter should not be misled into incorporating expectations instead
of intentions into the text." 85 He appears to mean the objective
"intentions" that the legislature expressed to reasonable readers through
the words that it chose.
Despite the apparent disparity of views, one generally finds
originalists making significant use of expectations only when the text's
meaning is vague or ambiguous, such as when courts interpret the Equal
Protection Clause. 86 A reasonable reading of the originalist canon
reveals that expectations may focus the objective meaning of unclear
text, but not blur the meaning of text that is otherwise clear.
Clarity itself, though, may be a contested concept when modern
values clash with the way that then-contemporary readers expected a
statute to apply. To say that the text unambiguously and clearly
comports with modern values in situations where original readers of the
the
puts
otherwise
thought
have
would
surely
statute
originalist/textualist method in a tight spot. The modern interpreter can
disclaim, imposing their own values while achieving that exact result.
"I'm not letting my own views influence the interpretative process," a
modern judge might say, "I am simply refusing to give credence to the
subjective views of the people at the time the legislature enacted the
statute because the text does not embody those views." That works as a
logical matter. But the obvious temptation to substitute one's own views
makes this process unacceptable from an originalist perspective. This
poses the question whether originalists have merely spoken with
insufficient clarity about the meaning-expectation distinction or whether,
if pressed, they wouldn't want to be any clearer. 87

83. WHITTINGTON, supra note 48, at 163, 186-87 (distinguishing intention from expectation
explaining "the textual meaning of those terms nonetheless depends on what the founders thought
the terms meant in using them," but not how they expected the text to apply).
84. Id. at 187.
85. Id.
86. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 60, at 375-76, 378-79.
87.

Cf MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 12-13 (1987) (addressing the

difficulty of norm legitimation).
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UNDERSTANDING THE BOSTOCK OPINIONS

This Part reviews the Bostock Justices' attempts to wiggle from the
tight spot between meaning and expectation. All three opinions took as
common ground that Title VII's text prohibited discrimination arising
from an employee's biological sex,88 and in 1964 neither Congress nor
the public would have expected the statute to prohibit adverse
employment decisions arising from an employee's sexual orientation or
gender identity. 89
The differing outcomes turned on how the Justices separated Title
VII's meaning from how people anticipated it would apply. The majority
walled off, and the dissent relied upon, those original expectations.
Both sides accused the other of making essentially the same error.
The majority scolded the dissenters for disregarding the text's semantic
meaning in context and improperly exploiting extratextual expectations
drawn from then-prevailing pervasive prejudice to create an exception
not found in the objective text.90 The dissent turned the tables, insisting
that a reasonable 1964 reader would not have understood Title VII to
protect homosexual and transgender persons. 9 1 To be sure, this
understanding rested on prejudices that we reject today. But for the
dissenters, that was irrelevant. Modern judges may not substitute their
own values for those embodied in the law's original public meaning. It
was thus the majority that went beyond the text to legislate liability for
conduct outside the statute's meaning.

88. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1750 (2020) (attributing this view to the
dissents as well as the majority). Although none of the opinions purport to rely on any change in the
meaning of the text between 1964 and today, some commentators have argued that the meaning of
"discriminate against" may have incorporated in 1964 a requirement of bias or prejudice that it may

not require today. Blackman & Barnett, supra note 5.
The cases in Bostock were all litigated as intentional discrimination cases, and none of the
opinions discussed the possibility of disparate impact challenges. It is interesting to note, however,
that women might well have a disparate impact challenge to an employment policy against hiring
homosexual individuals because among those individuals who identify as gay, fifty-eight percent
are women.

See

LGBT Data & Demographics, UCLA SCH.

OF L.: WILLIAMS

https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/visualization/lgbt-stats/?topic=LGBT#density
Feb. 8, 2021).

(last

INST.,

visited

89. Melissa Legault et al., Landmark U.S. Supreme Court Ruling Prohibits Sexual Orientation
and Gender Identity-Based Discrimination in Employment (US), NAT'L L. REv. (June 15, 2020),

https://www.natlawreview.com/article/landmark-us-supreme-court-ruling-prohibits-sexualorientation-and-gender-identity.
90. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1750-51.
91. Id. at 1767 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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After summarizing the majority opinion, this Part articulates the
four principal originalist arguments advanced by the dissenters. 92 For
each, it reviews the back and forth between the Justices and assesses
how each comports with originalism/textualism.
A.

The Opinion of the Court

When interpreting a law, the majority explained, a court must
"orient [itself] to the time of the statute's adoption" 93 to uncover the
text's public meaning. 94 In 1964, the Court assumed, the public meaning
of "sex" constituted biological distinctions between men and women. 95
Moving to the relevant clause, the Court focused on the public
meaning of sex in the context of the statute's language-"discriminate
against any individual .. . because of such individual's .. . sex." 96 For
guidance, the Court looked to its prior interpretation of the Age
Discrimination Act, which Congress enacted three years after Title VII
any
against
phrasing-"discriminate
same
the
using
97
individual ... because of such individual's age." In an opinion for the
Court using the originalist method, Justice Thomas concluded that the
statutory clause "because of' when followed by a type of discrimination
in the workplace established a but-for causation test.98
The Bostock Court then explained that, under such a test, if
changing the sex of the employee would alter the outcome under the
employer's discriminatory plan, then sex is a but-for cause of the

&

92. See infra Part III.B. In addition to their originalist arguments, the dissenters also raised
some non-originalist attacks on the majority opinion. Those parts of the dissent are generally
beyond the scope of this Article.
93. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1739.
96. Id. at 1751; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
97. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739 (citing Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176
(2009)); 29 U.S.C. § 623(aXl).
98. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739. After the Bostock decision, Blackman and Barnett questioned
whether the but--or standard had been adopted by the Court using originalist methods. Blackman
Barnett, supra note 5. But the Court relied on a 2009 opinion by Justice Thomas interpreting the
clause "because of age" in a similar mid-1960s civil rights statute using originalist methods. See
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739 ("[T]he ordinary meaning of the ADEA's requirement that an employer
took adverse action 'because of age is that age was the 'reason' that the employer decided to
act.... To establish a disparate-treatment claim under the plain language of the ADEA, therefore, a
plaintiff must prove that age was the 'but-for' cause of the employer's adverse decision." (citing
Gross, 557 U.S. at 176)). In 2013, the Court recognized that Congress intended a broader basis for
liability under Title VII, explaining that there "it suffices . .. to show that the motive to discriminate
was one of the employer's motives, even if the employer also had other, lawful motives that were
causative in the employer's decision." Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 343
(2013).
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relevant employment decision and the plaintiff would successfully
"trigger the law." 99
If an employer fires a woman for being "insufficiently feminine,"
but would not fire a man for that reason, the Court recognized, the
employer violates Title VII.100 And this is true even if the same
employer would also fire a man for being insufficiently masculine. 101
Although such an employer may treat men and women "more or less
equally," the sex of the victim is nonetheless a but-for cause of the
adverse action.10 2 "[I]n both cases the employer fires an individual in
part because of sex."10 3 The statutory text does not require proximate
cause. It is "irrelevant" if factors in addition to "sex contributed to the
[adverse] decision." 0 4 "[I]f changing the employee's sex would have
yielded a different choice by the employer-a statutory violation has
occurred." 0 5
Given this original public meaning, the Court concluded, Title VII
prohibited sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination.106 "[I]t
is impossible," the majority concluded, "to discriminate against a person
for being homosexual or transgender without discriminating against that
individual based on sex."1 07 The two categories, Gorsuch emphasized,
"are inextricably bound up with sex."1 08 An employer who dismisses a
man because he is attracted to another man, but would not dismiss a
woman for being attracted to a man, necessarily discriminates on the
basis of sex.1 09 And firing a male employee because he is attracted to
men punishes the man "for traits or actions [the employer] tolerates
in ... female colleague[s]."" 0 The traits of same-sex attraction, or
dressing in ways stereotypically associated with someone of the opposite
biological sex, are similar to the trait of acting insufficiently feminine.
And the result should thus be the same. Under the 1964 public meaning

99. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739.
100. Id. at 1741.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. (explaining that "it doesn't matter if the employer treated women as a group the same
when compared to men as a group").
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.; id. at 1737 (explaining that sex "plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the
decision, exactly what Title VII forbids"); id. at 1742 (explaining that an employer must
"intentionally treat individual employees

differently because of their sex" when an adverse

employment decision is made because an employee is homosexual or transgender).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1740-42.
110. Id. at 1741.
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of Title VII's text alone, then, sex is a but-for cause of discrimination
against a homosexual or transgender person."
The Court acknowledged that in 1964, legislators, and most of their
constituents, would not have expected Title VII to prohibit
discrimination against homosexual or transgender persons.1 2 "But the
limits of the drafters' imagination," Justice Gorsuch explained, "supply
no reason to ignore the law's demands."" 3 Legislators, the Court
recognized, also "weren't thinking about many of the Act's
consequences that have become apparent over the years, including its
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of motherhood or its ban
on the sexual harassment of male employees."" 4 Nonetheless, the Court
interpreted Title VII to prohibit these forms of discrimination because
expectations about how a law would apply to particular cases are
"extratextual considerations" that do not alter the statute's original
public meaning." 5 That Title VII protects homosexual and transgender
persons may have been "unexpected consequences,""1 6 but when
Congress fundamentally changes the law as it did with Title VII, the
7
Court emphasized, such consequences are "practically guarantee [d].""
B.

The Dissents'Four Takes on Why the Court Misappliedthe
OriginalistMethod

The dissenting Justices agreed that a court interpreting Title VII
should use an originalist/textualist method." 8 But they objected to how

111. Id. at 1738-39, 1741-42 (applying the same reasoning to transgender people, Justice
Gorsuch wrote: "[T]ake an employer who fires a transgender person who was identified as a male at
birth but who now identifies as a female. If the employer retains an otherwise identical employee
who was identified as female at birth, the employer intentionally penalizes a person identified as
male at birth for traits or actions that it tolerates in an employee identified as female at birth. Again,
the individual employee's sex plays an unmistakable and impermissible role in the discharge
decision," providing this hypothetical: "The employer hosts an office holiday party and invites
employees to bring their spouses. A model employee arrives and introduces a manager to Susan, the
employee's wife. Will that employee be fired? If the policy works as the employer intends, the
answer depends entirely on whether the model employee is a man or a woman. To be sure, that
employer's ultimate goal might be to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. But to achieve
that purpose the employer must, along the way, intentionally treat an employee worse based in part
on that individual's sex.").

112. Id. at 1737.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1737.
118. The dissenters also raised non-originalist arguments. Alito argued that the intent of the
legislature did not support the Court's result. Id. at 1776-77 (Alito, J., dissenting). This point is
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the majority distinguished meaning from expectation. 119 Their objections
fall roughly into four categories. The Court, the dissenters argued:
(1) applied the language literally, ignoring Title VII's
context; 120
(2) misunderstood the ordinary meaning that discriminate
againstan individualbecause of sex had in 1964;121
(3) ignored post-enactment historical evidence indicating that
Congress did not believe that Title VII covered sexual
orientation and gender identity discrimination;122 and
(4) failed to recognize a categorical linguistic distinction
between the concepts of discriminatingbecause of sex, on the
one hand, and because of homosexuality or gender identity, on
the other.12 1
The following Subparts explain each of these arguments and the
Court's reply. They then assess the argument through an originalist
prism.

beyond the scope of this Article except to say that subjective-intent-based interpretive arguments
raise the same meaning-expectation issue addressed here.
Neither dissenting Justice seemed concerned that Congress would disagree with the
Court's result. Of course, if Congress did disagree, it could overturn the Court's decision as it had
previously done with respect to multiple court decisions in earlier amendments. Instead, the
dissenters expressed concern that the Court's decision would lead to negative consequences that

could have been mollified if it had waited for Congress to amend Title VII. These arguments are not
originalist because originalism requires interpretation in line with the original public meaning
regardless of whether such a result would create ancillary issues requiring resolution. See supra Part
II.A.
The arguments, in any event, do not stand up to scrutiny. Nothing in the majority's

decision would hinder Congress's authority to address uncertainties arising from it, such as whether
Title VII would (1) recognize exceptions for religiously motivated discrimination against
homosexual or transgender persons, and (2) permit the still common practice of offering separate
restroom and locker room accommodations for men and women. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1778-79
(Alito, J., dissenting).
By stepping in, Kavanaugh contended, the Court "cashiers an ongoing legislative process,
at a time when a new law to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination was probably close at hand."

Id. at 1836 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). We can only guess at what Kavanaugh means by this
because of his choice of words. When used as a verb, cashier is generally defined as "to dismiss
(someone) from the armed forces in disgrace because of a serious misdemeanor." Cashier, LEXICO,
https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/cashier (last visited Feb. 8, 2021). Perhaps, he means that the
Court's decision undermined the legislative effort to engage with sexual orientation discrimination?
Given the current situation in Congress, it seems more likely that the Court's decision will

accelerate-not hinder-legislative action to deal with ancillary concerns.
119. See infra Part III.B.1-4.
120. See infra Part III.B.1.
121. See infra Part III.B.2.
122. See infra Part III.B.3.
123. See infra Part III.B.4.
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1. Context in Originalism
Kavanaugh argued that a reasonable reader taking context into
account would conclude that sexual orientation and gender identity
discrimination are not within the meaning of Title VII's text. 12 4
a. The Court's Debate over the Role of Context
Originalism demands a contextual assessment of the statute's
language, Kavanaugh correctly argued, because that meaning "is going
to be most accessible to the citizenry desirous of following the law and
to the legislators and their staffs drafting the legal terms of the plans
launched by statutes and to the administrators and judges implementing
the statutory plan." 125 The Court, he contended, wrongly ignored
context. 126

Attempting to show that Title VII in context did not protect
homosexual and transgender individuals, Kavanaugh compared
Bostock's facts to H.L.A Hart's famous hypothetical involving a statute
prohibiting "vehicles in the park." 12 7 While a baby carriage meets the
literal definition of a "vehicle"-a thing used for transporting people or
goods on land-the ordinary public meaning in the context of a "no
vehicles in the park" statute, Kavanaugh contended, would not cover
baby carriages; a reasonable reader of the "no vehicles" statute would
understand the text that way.1 2 8
The same principle, Kavanaugh contended, places sexual
orientation and gender identity discrimination outside of Title VII.129
Just as a reasonable person would understand the limits on the term
vehicle in the context of a statute prohibiting them in the park, such a
reader in 1964 would have understood that prohibiting sex
discrimination did not also limit adverse employment decisions based on
an employee's status as a homosexual or transgender person.13 0
In reply, the Court acknowledged that context matters, citing cases
in which it concluded that airplanes were not vehicles and that the term
"contracts of employment" included agreements with independent

124. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1824-25 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 1828 (quoting WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW
TO READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 81 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 2016)); see Scalia,

supra note 49, at 17-18.
126. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1825-27 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
127. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 125-26 (1961); Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1824-26
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
128. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1824-26 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 1824-28.
130. Id. at 1824-29.
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contractors.13 1 But Gorsuch distinguished those cases because they
involved original meanings that differed from current ones and context
helped reveal that distinction. In Bostock, the majority pointed out,
Kavanaugh failed to show that Title VII's text in 1964 "ordinarily
carried some message we have missed." 132
Instead of using context to inform the objective original public
meaning, the Court contended, the dissent "merely suggest[s] that,
because few in 1964 expected today's result, we should not dare to
admit that it follows ineluctably from the statutory text." 133 That "logic,"
the Court explained, "impermissibly seeks to displace the plain meaning
of the law in favor of something lying beyond it."' 34
b. The Context Argument Through an Originalist Prism
In debating this point, the Justices glossed over the foundation for
originalism's distinction between objective meaning and subjective
expectations. Essentially talking past each other, Kavanaugh never
explained why his contextual argument goes to objective meaning rather
than anticipated application. And Gorsuch accused Kavanaugh of
improperly considering extratextual expectations without explaining
where he crossed the line.135 Is it that baby carriages should have been
prohibited until the legislature amended the law? Or could Hart's
example be distinguished from the issue in Bostock?
Originalism can distinguish between these situations. A reasonable
reader of the no-vehicles statute would have recognized that (1) the
ordinance protected certain features embedded in the intersubjective
meaning of the phrase in the park (i.e., safety, quiet, strolling
peacefully), and (2) a baby carriage posed no threat to those features.13 6
On the contrary, strolling with babies enhanced the park-like features
that a reasonable reader would have understood the statute's text to
protect. By prohibiting "vehicles in the park" without exception, the
legislature appears to have misspoken.1 3 7 Without baby carriages, a park
131. Id. at 1750 (majority opinion).
132. Id. Some originalist commentators have argued that the 1964 meaning of "discriminate
against" did carry a message that the Court missed. See infra Part III.B.2.a.
133. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1750.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1738, 1749-50.
136. Cf Scalia, supra note 49, at 20-21 (explaining that a court may legitimately interpret the
statutory term "defendant" to mean "criminal defendant" when the context of the statute provides a

clear meaning).
137. Scalia drew a distinction between a "legislature obviously missp[eaking]" that may be
corrected by a court interpreting the statute, and a "legislature obviously overlegislat[ing]" that

should never be. Id. at 21.
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would be less park-like, a result clashing with the meaning of a statute
objectively intended to preserve park-like features.
The 1964 Congress, by contrast, could not legitimately be accused
of misspeaking in the same way. The contextual meaning of
discrimination because of sex comfortably encompasses sexual
orientation and gender identity discrimination in a way that no vehicles
in the park does not encompass baby carriages. Title VII prohibits
workplace discrimination against individuals whose sex has led
employers to treat them unfairly. 8 Prohibiting baby carriages conflicts
with the contextual meaning of in the park by making the environment
less park-like. By contrast, barring discrimination against homosexual or
transgender individuals fits comfortably with Title VII's contextual
meaning to make workplaces more open to historically disadvantaged

groups. 139
Rather than misspeaking, Kavanaugh would have to accuse the
1964 Congress of "overlegislat[ing]," a term Scalia used in cases where
the statutory language literally applies to more situations than legislators
would have anticipated or wanted.1 40 As Scalia has argued, within the
originalist/textualist model, an interpreting court should never bail out a
legislature that has overlegislated. 141

2. Motivational Originalism
Alito contended that the phrase discriminate because of sex
required an employer to adopt a discriminatory project animated solely
by an individual employee's biological sex and "not because that person
is sexually attracted to members of the same sex or identifies as a
member of a particular gender." 42 Essentially, Alito read Title VII to
include a proximate cause standard.143
138. Blackman & Barnett, supra note 5.
139.

See id.; see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 40, at 63 (explaining that "[a] textually

permissible interpretation that furthers rather than obstructs the document's purpose should be
favored").

140. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1825, 1827 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (discussing the
importance of judges adhering to the ordinary meaning of a law rather than a hidden, obscure, or
overbroad meaning); Scalia, supra note 49, at 21 (explaining overlegislation as judges ignoring the
text of the statute and focusing on legislative intent when interpreting statutes).
141. See Scalia, supra note 49, at 20-22; Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1755-56 (Alito, J., dissenting).
To the extent that a reader is sympathetic with Lon Fuller's critique of Hart's use of this example,

they might conclude that Hart's hypothetical legislature also over-legislated, and thus only that
legislature-within an originalist/textualist model-could create an exception for baby carriages. Of
course, that view would further confirm that Kavanaugh's argument is wrong from an originalist
perspective. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism andFidelity to Law-A Reply to ProfessorHart, 71 HARV. L.
REv. 630, 662-64 (1958).
142. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1756-57 (Alito, J., dissenting).
143. It is possible that Alito intended this argument in two other ways. First, he may have
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a. The Court's Debate over the Role of Motivation
To demonstrate the required sex-based animus, Alito argued, the
employer must take adverse action based solely on its knowledge of the
biological sex of the employee. 1 4 An employer that dismisses an
employee only after learning additional information does not
discriminate because of sex.1 45
Alito dismissed the Court's hypotheticals because the employers
took adverse action only after learning "something new, [the
employee's] sexual orientation, and it was this new information that
motivated [the] discharge. So ... discrimination because of sexual
orientation does not inherently involve discrimination because of sex." 146
He concluded, "[A]ttraction to members of their own sex-in a word,
sexual orientation ... is the employer's real motive."14 7
Post-Bostock originalist commentators have generally sided with
Alito.148 In place of his proximate cause standard, however, they contend
intended to make a non-originalist argument. He clearly raises non-originalist arguments in other
parts of his opinion. If that is the case, then his argument is beyond the scope of this Article.
Second, he may have intended to use the way people spoke about discrimination in 1964 as a way to
uncover the original public meaning of the text. That argument is addressed infra Part III.B.4.
144. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1757-58 (Alito, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 1760. Josh Blackman and Randy Barnett, commenting on the Bostock case, put a
slightly different spin on Alito's argument. In 1964, they argued citing dictionary definitions,
"discriminate against" meant that the difference in treatment must be "based on some trait [that is]
motivated by prejudice, or biased ideas or attitudes." Blackman & Barnett, supra note 5. And

Megan Arago and David Upham cited prior laws and treaties prohibiting discrimination against
women in other contexts that had not been interpreted to prohibit all distinctions based on sex.
"[E]mployers make a discrimination when they hire only males as truck drivers," the authors
argued, but not by "merely accept[ing] a distinction when they incorporate the prevailing custom of
separate restrooms for men and women. ... Neither the intent nor the letter of the Civil Rights Act,
nor the Court's own jurisprudence compels sex blindness." Arago & Upham, supra note 5. These
alternative appeals to history, though, do not change Alito's basic argument or undermine the

majority opinion. To be sure, in 1964 some sex-based distinctions-like sex specific bathroomsmay not have constituted discrimination both because they were not animated by bias and because
prior anti-discrimination law-such as in the education context-had never been held to prohibit
them. But refusing to hire a woman because she is sexually attracted to other women does consist of
a bias against women, just as would refusing to hire a woman who acted like a man. Sexual
orientation or gender identity discrimination is more akin to refusing to hire women to be truck
drivers than to requiring them to use same-biological-sex bathrooms. If there is a meaningful
distinction to be made between sexual orientation and gender identity, on the one hand, and
job-type, on the other, the originalist commentators haven't articulated it. And the basis for deciding
that excluding those sexually attracted to persons of same biological sex is not due to a bias or
discrimination but excluding those who act like a member of the opposite biological sex is a

produce of bias, is not readily apparent to say the least.
146. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1760 (Alito, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 1763. The discrimination may be related to sex, Alito admitted, but he contended,
"Title VII prohibits discrimination because of sex itself, not everything that is related to, based on,
or defined with reference to, 'sex."' Id. at 1761.
148. See Blackman, supra note 6.
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that in 1964, adverse employment decisions against gay and transgender
persons would not have been understood to be discrimination against
them. 149 Blackman and Barnett point to contemporary dictionary
definitions defining discriminate to require a distinction resting on an
unfair bias, not any form of differing treatment. 50 And Arago and
Upham cited pre-Title VII law prohibiting sex discrimination that they
claim contrasts "mak[ing] a discrimination" with "accept[ing] a
distinction.""'
Although the originalist commentary is not as explicit as it might
be, the point seems to be that in 1964, many people-including the
medical community-thought that gay people suffered from a mental
disorder and conduct associated with homosexuality constituted a
felony. 52 Justice Gorsuch acknowledged that refusing to hire
homosexual individuals was not the "principal evil" at which Congress
aimed Title VII. 5 3 The commentators-as Justice Alito articulated the
point-argued that refusing to hire gay individuals "would not have been
evil at all." 5 4
Gorsuch replied with a hypothetical response to both Alito's
proximate cause argument and the originalist commentators' point about
the definition of discriminate."5 He posited an employer desiring to
follow 1950s era stereotypes about the appropriate roles of men and
women.1 56 Such an employer would be happy to hire women, so long as
they applied for secretary jobs. But men, who were never hired as
secretaries, received all of the mechanic positions. Men and women are
treated equally in that they are both penalized or favored depending on
the job they sought. Yet, the employer in the hypothetical would violate
Title VII. The employer's need for additional information beyond the
sex of the employee-namely the position for which an applicant
applied-would not insulate the employer. " Nor would the fact that

149. See Blackman & Barnett, supra note 5.
150. Id.
151. Arago & Upham, supra note 5 (analogizing to cases holding that affirmative action does
not violate Title VII and explaining that prior anti-sex discrimination law "in no way would
preclude the virtually universal sex-specific customs as to clothing, modes of address, the meaning
of marriage, etc."). Arago and Upham do not cite particular decisions holding that pre-1960s
anti-discrimination law protecting women did not protect gay women. Their point seems to be
merely that no one thought to apply those pre-1960s laws to protect homosexual persons.
152. Beverley d'Silva, When Gay Meant Mad, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 3, 1996, 11:02 PM),
https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/when-gay-meant-mad- 1308085.html.
153. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1749.
154. Id. at 1774 (Alito, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 1748-49 (majority opinion).
156. Id.
157. Id.
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many people in 1964 would have agreed that women should not be
mechanics.
Neither Alito nor the originalist commentators took issue with this
hypothetical. Arago and Upham acknowledge that hiring only male truck
drivers, for example, would violate Title VII.158 Yet, Gorsuch argued,
when the basis for the discrimination switched from the type of position
that the employee sought to the gender to whom the employee is
sexually attracted, "or persons identified at birth as women who later
identify as men," the dissent-and he could now add the originalist
commentators-propose "suddenly roll[ing] out a new and more
rigorous standard?"1 59
The prevailing view in 1964 included the notion that certain jobs
were inappropriate for women, just as a prevailing view existed that
people should not be sexually attracted to their own gender or dress in
ways stereotypically associated with the opposite gender. t 0 Yet,
originalist commentators argue, Title VII somehow applied to the former
but not the latter. Neither the dissent nor the commentators convincingly
justified this distinction.
Perhaps they would argue that job-type bias differed because it
focused on a particularly women-centric bias, i.e., that females should
only work in the home or at certain jobs deemed appropriate for them. 161
Presumably, refusing to hire a woman because she is a lesbian does not
exhibit a similar inappropriate woman-focused bias, but only a
then-appropriate bias against a particular sexual orientation.
In any individual case, though, the bias is related to a particular trait
that was unpopular under then-prevailing social norms but was not
mentioned in the text. Whether that trait is being suited to work only at
jobs deemed appropriate for women or being sexually attracted to
females, the discrimination is only directed at women and is based on a
sense that they are straying beyond situations appropriate for their
gender. Whether this straying was toward a job like a truck driver or a

158. Arago & Upham, supra note 5.
159. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1749.
160. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 231-34 (1989).
161. Blackman & Barnett, supra note 5 (referring to Justice Ginsberg's oral argument in a
biopic attacking the belief that "all women are preoccupied with home and children" as
exemplifying a prejudice that "help keep [a] woman in her place, a place inferior to that occupied by

men in our society"); id. (arguing "[b]y the 1960s, the phrase discriminate against because of sex
had formed a single linguistic unit. The whole conveyed more meaning than the sum of its parts.
This concept did not merely refer to blindly treating a man differently than a woman. Rather, this
standard made bias orprejudice an essential element of the casual injury"); Arago & Upham, supra
note 5 (quoting Ruth Bader Ginsberg in Brief for Appellant at 19 & n.13, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971) (No. 430)).
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romantic relationship with another woman, the bias motivating the
discrimination comes from the same place.
The originalist commentators might respond that these traits differ
because the former impacts all women while the latter only impacts
lesbians. But Title VII, as the majority explained, has always been
162
understood to reach discrimination that does not apply to all women; a
discriminatory plan, for example, limited to women who were pregnant
or mothers of young children violates Title VII.1 63 Nothing in the text
could therefore account for treating job type differently from sexual
orientation or gender identity as a basis for the discrimination. 1"4 All
were part of the prevailing view in 1964 and thus the clause discriminate
because of sex would have to apply to all of them or none. No "canon of
165
donut holes," the majority argued, would justify an implied exception.
"Congress's failure to speak directly to a specific case that falls within a
more general statutory rule," the Court recognized, has never been held
to "create[] a tacit exception."1 66
b. The Motivation Argument Through Originalism's Prism
Both Justice Alito's proximate cause standard-that the dismissal
was motivated by animus toward a particular biological sex and required
no additional information-and the originalist commentators' point
162. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1745.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 1748-49. In 1964, Title VII conceivably left room for distinguishing between
excluding a woman for being, or acting like, a lesbian, on the one hand, and for defying traditional
female stereotypes on the other, because only that latter applied to all women. But subsequent
amendments to Title VII make explicit that sex discrimination includes types of discrimination that
only affect some women. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (defining discrimination because of sex to
include, inter alia, discrimination based on "pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions");
§ 2000e-2(k) (recognizing disparate impact cases that do not arise from intentional bias). An
originalist must look to the public meaning at the time the legislature adopted relevant amendments
to the statute.
Arago and Upham focus on distinctions such as gender specific bathrooms that may
respect privacy interests of both sexes. Arago & Upham, supra note 5. They conclude that the
majority's Bostock opinion compels the result that all such distinctions violate Title VII. Id. The
Court, however, flagged but did not address this issue. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1754. Because
distinctions like same-sex bathrooms do further shared interests of both sexes in personal privacy,
they would not appear to constitute discrimination against an employee because of their sex in a
way that refusing to hire gay or transgender persons does. Andrew Koppelman, Bostock, LGBT
Discrimination, and the Subtractive Moves, 105 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 1, 23-24 (2020) ("In

sex discrimination law, it must be acknowledged, separate but equal does have a legitimate place.").
165. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1747.
166. Id. A different justification for concluding that refusing to hire gay or transgender
individuals in 1964 was not discrimination is that the medical community then considered them to
suffer from a mental disorder and statutory law made certain homosexual conduct a felony. See
supra Part III.B.l.a.
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about the then-contemporary definition of discriminate, ignore that
Congress amended Title VII to permit claims even though (1) the
employer required additional information beyond biological sex to
implement its discriminatory plan, and (2) in 1964 most people would
167
not have deemed the distinction the employer drew as inappropriate.
Even if Justice Alito and the post-Bostock originalist commentators
were correct that Title VII's original public meaning somehow
distinguished job-type bias from sexual orientation or gender identity
bias, they could not get around the text of subsequent amendments
rejecting that interpretation, and it is the original meaning of the statute
68
at the time of those amendments that must control.1
Early on, the Court recognized that Title VII's text applied to a
discriminatory plan that targeted mothers with young children, but not
all women.1 69 Were Alito's or the commentators' interpretation of Title
VII correct, the Court should have held that the employer did not violate
the statute. It needed more information than sex alone to implement the
discriminatory plan, and in 1964, the notion that mothers of young
children should not work was well accepted, yet the Court held that Title

VII applied. 7 0
The early 1970s Court, of course, could have been wrong. The
without any
a short, per curiam decision
opinion was
the
questioned
never
Congress
But
171
analysis.
originalist/textualist
clarify
VII
to
Title
amending
decision, and effectively ratified it by later
72
that sex discrimination included discrimination based on childbirth.1
173
A few years later in General Electric v. Gilbert, the Court
174
It held
employed reasoning similar to Alito's and the commentators'.
not
did
pregnancy
cover
to
that a health benefits package failing

167. See supra notes 144-47, 155-61 and accompanying text. The majority essentially made
this point explaining that Alito's reasoning, if adopted, would create "a curious discontinuity in [the
Court's] case law." Bostock, 140

S.

Ct. at 1749.

&

168. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (defining sex discrimination to include differing treatment based
on pregnancy and childbearing).
169. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 543-44 (1971) (per curiam) (holding
policy against hiring women with pre-school-age children constituted sex discrimination). The
Court recognized that refusing to hire the mothers of young children constituted sex discrimination
despite evidence that seventy-five to eighty percent of those hired for the position for which the
employer had rejected the plaintiff were women. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 added this language to Title VII. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 670-71
nn.1-2 (1983).
173. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
174. Id. at 127-28.
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constitute discrimination because ofsex.1 75 Refusing to cover pregnancy,
the Court reasoned, "does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility
because of gender but merely removes one physical conditionpregnancy-from the list of compensable disabilities."'1 7 6
Gilbert's reasoning is consistent with the commentators' because in
1964, a distinction based on pregnancy would not have been viewed as a
discrimination motivated by improper bias. The Gilbert Court's
reasoning also lines up with Alito's because an employer that plans to
discriminate on the basis of pregnancy does not act based on knowledge
of the employee's sex alone. A woman beyond childbearing years, for
example, would suffer no discrimination. Nor is pregnancy-based
discrimination limited to women. A benefits package that provided
pregnancy benefits to female employees, but not the female spouses of
male employees, would discriminate against men. 177 Before the
employer could discriminate against a particular employee it would have
to know not just biological sex, but also additional informationwhether the employee (or their spouse) was pregnant or at least could be.
Less than two years later, Congress rejected the Gilbert Court's
reasoning.1 7 8 Importantly, the legislature did not correct a mistake by
adding discrimination based on pregnancy to Title VII's text. Instead,
Congress made clear that the Court had erred in failing to recognize that
discrimination based on pregnancy is sex discrimination. 7 9 And shortly
thereafter, the Court confirmed that providing pregnancy benefits to
female employees, but denying them to the spouses of all employees,
also violated Title VII. 180
Next, the Court held that harassment constituted discrimination
because of sex. 18' Employers, of course, did not reflexively harass every
woman they hired. On the contrary, in a typical case, the employer
would need additional information before it could implement a

175. Id.
176. Id. at 134.
177. See Newport News, 462 U.S. at 676 (recognizing that a benefit package providing
pregnancy benefits to female employees, but not spouses of all employees, discriminated against
men, violating Title VII).
178. Id. at 670.
179. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (adopting Pub. L. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076, adding to the definitional
section of the statute that sex discrimination included pregnancy discrimination); see Newport News,
462 U.S. at 670, 676 (recognizing that after Gilbert, Congress revised the definitional section to
make clear that under Title VII pregnancy-based discrimination was discrimination because of sex).
180. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 685 (holding that providing pregnancy benefits to women, but
not to the spouses of male employees, also constituted sex discrimination).
181. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (holding that sexual harassment
constituted sex discrimination and explaining "a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by
proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment").
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harassment plan. Perhaps only women who did not welcome a
18 2
or those who did
supervisor's romantic advances would be harassed
the employer
that
traits
not display the stereotypical feminine

expected."

3

A decade later, the Court recognized that male-on-male harassment
18 4
Again, the employer
also constituted discrimination because of sex.
the employee. Not
of
sex
the
would need additional information beyond
all men were harassed, only those that acted in ways that the harassers
believed were inappropriate.
Alito does not question the Court's decisions. Instead, he attempts
to distinguish them on the ground that in each, the discrimination was
based on the employee's biological sex-only a woman can be a
mother185 and maleness is a biological sex even if discrimination against
86
males was not expected to be a basis for Title VII liability.' But in each
of these cases, the employer required additional information beyond the
employee's sex before the employer could implement the discriminatory
plan against a particular individual.
And in Bostock, the discriminatory plans similarly focused on a
particular sex in each individual case.1 87 Being sexually attracted to
women or dressing in a stereotypically male fashion are only problems if
the employee is a woman, just as having young children, finding a
heterosexual man's romantic advances unwelcome, and acting in a
masculine way are only problems to the employer if the employee is a
woman.

182. Id. at 68 (explaining that "[t]he gravamen of [such a] claim is that the alleged sexual
advances were 'unwelcome"').
183. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(recognizing that "we are beyond the day when an employer could [legitimately] evaluate
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group").
184. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998). Congress's failure to
limit the harassment cases despite amending Title VII in other ways is, of course, not determinative
of the original meaning of Title VII's text. But Justice Alito does not pursue this argument,
accepting the holdings of the Court's harassment cases. See infra note 186.
185. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1775 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 1774 ("But the more important difference between these cases and Oncale is that
here the interpretation that the Court adopts does not fall within the ordinary meaning of the
statutory text as it would have been understood in 1964. To decide for the defendants in Oncale, it
would have been necessary to carve out an exception to the statutory text. Here, no such surgery is
at issue. Even if we totally disregard the societal norms of 1964, the text of Title VII does not
support the Court's holding. And the reasoning of Oncale does not preclude or counsel against our
taking those norms into account. They are relevant, not for the purpose of creating an exception to
the terms of the statute, but for the purpose of better appreciating how those terms would have been
understood at the time.").
187. Id. at 1746 (majority opinion).
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3. Post-Enactment Historical Evidence
Both dissenters begin their opinions with, and emphasize repeatedly
throughout, that (1) Congress included sexual orientation and gender
identity in other anti-discrimination statutes and considered amending

Title VII to include sexual orientation discrimination, but had not done
so, 188 and (2) every lower court, prior to 2017, had rejected the claim
that Title VII applied to discrimination against homosexual persons. 89
These points are powerful rhetorically, but they are not originalism.
a. The Court's Debate of the Post-Enactment Historical
Evidence
Congressional action and inaction along with court decisions, the
dissenters argued, confirmed that Title VII's meaning could not have
included sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination.190 If it
did, why would Congress have singled out these sorts of discrimination
in other statutes, and considered amending Title VII to add them, rather
than relying on sex discrimination to cover it all? Why would no court
have recognized for so long that sex discrimination included these other
forms?
The majority responded that drawing inferences from subsequent
congressional action and lower court decisions is, from an originalist
perspective, fraught with difficulty. 191 These sorts of arguments, the
majority apparently believed, shirk the Court's responsibility. "When a
new application emerges that is both unexpected and important,"
Gorsuch wrote, the dissenters "would seemingly have us merely point
out the question, refer the subject back to Congress, and decline to
enforce the plain terms of the law in the meantime."1 92 For the majority,
that was not a legitimate option.
b. Post-Enactment Historical Evidence Through Originalism's
Prism
The dissenters framed their post-enactment evidence in originalist
terms, but they obviously intended it to serve a powerful rhetorical
purpose as well. In a free-for-all interpretive exercise where anything
goes, and the interpreter seeks to balance all the interests raised, the

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1755, 1773 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 1822-24 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
at 1778 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 1833-34 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
at 1754-55 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 1829 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
at 1747 (majority opinion).
at 1750.
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193
and posing
rhetorical power of calling a court decision "legislation"
94
is compelling.
the question as "[w]ho decides?"
But the dissents did not claim that the Court should interpret
statutes in such an open-ended way. They professed to follow the
originalist/textualist method. And for an originalist, post-enactment
conduct is "the least reliable source for recovering the original meaning
of the law." 195 An originalist should not even consider this evidence
unless the text is vague or ambiguous and the post-enactment evidence
somehow sheds light on how a reasonable reader of the law at the time
of its enactment would have understood its text.196 To open the inquiry
into public meaning to the rhetorical force of this post-enactment
evidence, as the dissents do, isn't originalism.1 97
This does not mean that the dissents' post-enactment historical
evidence has no relevance to original meaning. But that tie needs to be
made explicitly by showing how subsequent events relate back to the
intersubjectively understood meaning that reasonable readers would
understand. The dissenters did try to make that tie, and the next Subpart
addresses that effort.

4. Prevailing View, Linguistic Categories & Originalism
The final parry by the dissenting Justices to the majority's holding
contended that the post-enactment historical evidence they cited-when
considered alongside common parlance-demonstrated that sex
discrimination, on the one hand, and sexual orientation or gender
identity discrimination on the other, are distinct categories.1 98 Alito
99
relied directly on the prevailing view in the mid-1960s.1 Kavanaugh
argued that the way we speak confirms that the two types of
discrimination are different. 200 Balls and blocks are both children's toys,
but they are in distinct linguistic categories, i.e., toys that roll and toys
that stack. When you say one, you don't mean to include the other. And
for that reason, Title VII's original public meaning did not include
sexual orientation and transgender discrimination.

193. Id. at 1754 (Alito, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 1822 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
195. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 41, at 553.
196. Id.
197. Tellingly, the post-Bostock originalist commentators have not made much of this
post-enactment evidence, focusing instead on pre-1964 dictionary definitions, statutes, and treatises.
See Blackman & Barnett, supra note 5; Arago & Upham, supra note 5; Whelan, supra note 5.
198. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1758 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 1824, 1828 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting).
199. Id. at 1756-57 (Alito, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 1828 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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a. The Court's Debate of the Linguistic Category Argument
This Subpart addresses the back and forth on the prevailing view
and linguistic category arguments.
i. Prevailing View
Alito accurately recognized that the search for the original public
meaning "calls for an examination of the social context in which a
statute was enacted because this may have an important bearing on what
its words were understood to mean at the time of enactment." 201 He then
tacitly shifted gears, framing the question as what "a group of average
Americans" reading Title VII in 1964 would have understood the phrase
"discrimination because of sex" to mean. 20 2 Social context is relevant to
intersubjective meaning, but it doesn't equate to what average
Americans thought. Public meaning looks to a reasonable objective
reader, not an average one.
"If every single living American had been surveyed in 1964," Alito
predicted, "it would have been hard to find any who thought that
discrimination because of sex meant discrimination because of sexual
orientation-not to mention gender identity, a concept that was
essentially unknown at the time."2 03 The survey phrasing compounds the
problem. Surveys assess contested, subjective values, not intersubjective
meaning.
Recognizing this, the Court rhetorically asked whether Alito's
purported survey results were "really true?" 2 4 Pointing to early
complaints in Title VII cases alleging that adverse employment
decisions based on sexual orientation violated the statute, 20 the Court
201. Id. at 1767 (Alito, J., dissenting). We need to be careful to distinguish this argument from
the core originalist position that the text of a statute needs to be interpreted in context. The
originalist is referring to the context of the language of the statute as a whole and where it fits within
the broader legal system. When Alito refers to "social context," he is looking to something different,
namely the prevailing views of the time.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1755, 1767 ("In 1964, ordinary Americans reading the text of Title VII would not
have dreamed that discrimination because of sex meant discrimination because of sexual
orientation, much less gender identity."); id. at 1772 (explaining "they would have been bewildered
to hear that this law also forbids discrimination on the basis of 'transgender status' or 'gender
identity,' terms that would have left people at the time scratching their heads"); id. at 1769
("Discrimination 'because of sex' was not understood as having anything to do with discrimination
because of sexual orientation or transgender status. Any such notion would have clashed in
spectacular fashion with the societal norms of the day."); id. at 1774 ("Whether we like to admit it
now or not, in the thinking of Congress and the public at that time, such discrimination would not
have been evil at all.").
204. Id. at 1750 (majority opinion).
205. Id. at 1750-51 (citing Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp. 1098, 1099 (N.D. Ga.
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revealed the limits of the text's intersubjective meaning. Sexual
orientation discrimination could not have been excluded by Title VII's
original public meaning because all reasonable readers did not agree.
The early complaints made that clear.
Alito accused the Court of citing paltry evidence, presumably
because there were only a small number of complaints alleging sexual
orientation discrimination over the statute's first decade and a half.206
But that reaction reveals the different ways that the Court and the dissent
treated the meaning-expectations distinction. Alito looked to the
prevailing view among members of the public-what a survey would
reveal.2 07 A couple of complaints over a decade could not cast doubt on
that.
For the Court, a survey probing differing subjective values could
not cast doubt on a public meaning that is, by definition,
intersubjective-the same for everyone.2 08 Meaning is not a popularity
contest. The Court asked, rhetorically, "How many people have to
foresee the application for it to qualify as 'expected'?" 209 If legislators
and most members of the general public did not think about whether
Title VII covered sexual orientation, the Court wondered, why should
their expectations override the expectations of "those with reason to
think about the question?" 2 10
The complaints thus showed that gay and lesbian individuals-who
were not steeped in prevalent mid-1960s prejudice against people like
them-had concluded early on that Title VII covered sexual orientation
discrimination. 211 They demonstrated as much by filing suit. Reasonable
people could thus contest whether Title VII prohibited discrimination
against gay individuals. And the negative prevailing view was thus part
of the statute's non-fixed applicative meaning, not its fixed semantic
meaning.
Applying a statute in surprising ways when the beneficiary is a
dominant group-as the Court did in Oncale for men who were
1975) (addressing a claim from 1969)); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661
(9th Cir. 1977) (addressing a claim from 1974); Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82
YALE L.J. 573, 583-84 (1973).
206. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1772 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("The Court makes a tiny effort to
suggest that at least some people in 1964 might have seen what Title VII really means.... What
evidence does it adduce? One complaint filed in 1969, another filed in 1974, and arguments made in
the mid-1970s about the meaning of the Equal Rights Amendment. To call this evidence merely
feeble would be generous.").

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 1755.
See id. at 1750 (majority opinion); see also id. at 1771-72 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1751 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
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harassed-but refusing to apply it to benefit parties who were unpopular
at the time of its enactment, is not recognizing the original public
meaning. It's supplanting that meaning to, as the Court put it, "tilt the
scales of justice in favor of the strong or popular and neglect the promise
that all persons are entitled to the benefit of the law's terms." 2 1 2
ii. Linguistic Categories
Kavanaugh focused on how people spoke rather than how they
thought. 213 With respect to sexual orientation and gender identity, the
latter may be subjective and thus inappropriate evidence of original
public meaning, but the former, he claimed, is acceptably objective. 214
Sexual orientation discrimination, Kavanaugh asserted, "has long
and widely been understood as distinct from, and not a form of, sex
discrimination." 215 "Most everyone familiar with the use of the English
language in America," he contended, "understands that the ordinary
meaning of sexual orientation discrimination is distinct from the
ordinary meaning of sex discrimination."2 16 There is a "distinctive nature
of anti-gay prejudice," he argued,217 such that "[t]o a fluent speaker of
the English language-then and now .. . discrimination 'because of sex'
is not reasonably understood to include discrimination based on sexual
orientation, a different immutable characteristic."2 18 As a result,
"[c]lassifying people by sexual orientation is different than classifying
them by sex. The two traits are categorically distinct and widely
recognized as such. There is no ambiguity or vagueness here." 219 The
Bostock plaintiffs were thus-in common parlance-fired "because they
were gay, not because they were men. "220
Kavanaugh then tied the post-enactment evidence-the text of
statutes, regulations, and proposed amendments as well as judicial
decisions-to original public meaning by arguing they evinced the way
that reasonable people communicated about sexual orientation

212. Id. "[T]he same judicial humility that requires us to refrain from adding to statutes," the
Court concluded, "requires us to refrain from diminishing them." Id. at 1753.
213. See id. at 1828, 1833 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 1834.
215. Id. at 1835.
216. Id.
217. Id. (citing Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 162 (2d Cir. 2018) (Lynch, J.,
dissenting)).
218. Id. at 1833 (quoting Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 363 (7th Cir.
2017) (Sykes, J., dissenting)).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1828.
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discrimination.221 The law, he argued, "has always reflected [the]
common usage and recognized th[e] distinction between sex
discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination."2 22 And "[w]e
cannot close our eyes to the indisputable fact that Congress-for several
decades in a large number of statutes-has identified sex discrimination
and sexual orientation discrimination as two distinct categories." 223
Alito supplied one additional piece of historical evidence
supporting the conclusion that sex discrimination is in a different
category from sexual orientation discrimination. 224 "[I]n 1964," he
observed, citing medical texts and statutes, that "homosexuality was
thought to be a mental disorder, and homosexual conduct was regarded
as morally culpable and worthy of punishment." 2 25 All of this evidence,
that sexual
Kavanaugh argued, "overwhelmingly establish[es]
orientation discrimination is distinct from, and not a form of, sex
discrimination." 226
The Court again accused the dissenters of blurring the distinction
between meaning and expectations. 227 As Gorsuch explained,
"conversational conventions do not control Title VII's legal analysis,
which asks simply whether sex was a but-for cause." 228 Comparing the
situation to Phillips, the Court reasoned that a woman who was not hired
because she had kids at home might well say that her "application was
rejected because she was a mother, or because she had young
children." 22 9 In Phillips, women overwhelmingly held the position for
which the plaintiff was rejected.230 It would thus have been awkward in
common parlance to say that the plaintiff "was not hired because she
was a woman." 231 Nevertheless, the Phillips Court "did not hesitate to

221. Id. at 1829-33.
222. Id. at 1835. Even Kavanaugh could not always avoid slipping into the prevailing-view
version of public meaning, equating it to "how 'most people' 'would have understood' the text of a
statute when enacted." Id. at 1828 (quoting New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019)).
223. Id. at 1830.
224. Id. at 1769-70 (Alito, J., dissenting).
225. Id. (describing homosexuality as "a sexual deviation" that was "a particular type of
sociopathic personality disturbance").
226. Id. at 1833 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 1749-52 (majority opinion).
228. Id. at 1745.
229. Id.
230. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 543 (1971).
231. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1745. The Court's recognizing that Title VII covers discrimination
against mothers makes this point even more clearly. The concept of motherhood is distinct from sex.
A 1960s employer easily could have said, and everyone would have understood, that it was
discriminating against mothers. They could plausibly believe that women can effectively do the job,
just not when she is distracted by small children at home. So, just as an employer can say, "I am not
discriminating against this man because he is sexually attracted to other men, I am discriminating
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recognize that the employer ... discriminated against the plaintiff
because of her sex." 232
Quoting Oncale, which held that harassment of men fell within
Title VII's original public meaning, Gorsuch wrote, "To be sure, the
statute's application in these cases reaches 'beyond the principal evil'
legislators may have intended or expected to address." 233 But only "the
provisions of our laws [legitimately bind our actions] rather than the
principal concerns of our legislators." 23 4
Adopting the dissent's approach to statutory interpretation, the
Court appeared to fear, might also create room for interpreters to sneak
their own values into the analysis, albeit perhaps unconsciously. "One
could also reasonably fear," Gorsuch argued, "that objections about
unexpected applications will not be deployed neutrally."235 After all, the
against him because he's gay," the employer could have said "I am discriminating against the
mother of young children not because she is a woman, but because young children will distract her
from doing her job." In each case, these are distinct linguistic concepts. Yet, the Court in Phillips
recognized that Title VII reaches them. See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339,
354-55 (7th Cir. 2017) (Posner, J., concurring) ("The position of a woman discriminated against on
account of being a lesbian is thus analogous to a woman's being discriminated against on account of
being a woman.... I don't see why firing a lesbian because she is in the subset of women who are
lesbian should be thought any less a form of sex discrimination than firing a woman because she's a
woman. But it has taken our courts and our society a considerable while to realize that sexual
harassment, ... is a form of sex discrimination. It has taken a little longer for realization to dawn
that discrimination based on a woman's failure to fulfill stereotypical gender roles is also a form of
sex discrimination. And it has taken still longer, with a substantial volume of cases struggling and
failing to maintain a plausible, defensible line between sex discrimination and sexual-orientation
discrimination, to realize that homosexuality is nothing worse than failing to fulfill stereotypical
gender roles.").
232. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1745.
233. Id. at 1749 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998)).
234. Id. (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79). When statutes are ambiguous as to their original
public meaning, the Court has often looked to outside sources to clarify that ambiguity. However,
"the fact that [a statute] has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does
not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,
499 (1985) (quoting Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi., 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir.
1984)).
235. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1751. Although Justice Kavanaugh maintained a consistent position
that he personally had no problem with the result in Bostock, Justice Alito's opinion was less clear.
He posited that a woman who had been traumatized from being attacked by a man would be forced
to share a locker room with a biological male. Id. at 1778-79 (Alito, J., dissenting). Of course,
traumatization could occur in ways that would make same-biological-sex locker rooms equally
problematic. Women, sometimes, attack people, too, and some people are attacked by people of
different races from their own. One wonders if Justice Alito would like different locker rooms for
all these possible groups and subdivisions? He also raised the issue of teachers who might be
homosexual or transgender. "A school's standards for its faculty 'communicate a particular way of
life to its students,"' he wrote, "and a 'violation by the faculty of those precepts' may undermine the

school's 'moral teaching."' Id. at 1781. He then gave an intriguing example that he found
problematic: "[I]f a religious school teaches that sex outside marriage . . . [is] immoral, the message
may be lost if the school employs a teacher who is in a same-sex relationship .... " Id. Revealingly,
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Court unanimously interpreted Title VII to protect against male-on-male
harassment, an unanticipated application that benefited a dominant
group, namely men. Yet, the dissenters refused to do the same for
homosexual and transgender persons. "Often lurking just behind such
objections," the Court recognized, "resides a cynicism that Congress
236
This
could not possibly have meant to protect a disfavored group."
approach is not uncovering the original public meaning. "[T]he same
judicial humility that requires us to refrain from adding to statutes," the
23 7
Court concluded, "requires us to refrain from diminishing them."
b. The Linguistic Categories Argument Through
Originalism's Prism
Kavanagh's argument boiled down to this: the prevailing prejudice
of the era in which the legislature passed a statute informs its public
meaning-even when that prejudice is not reflected in either the literal
text or the context of the entire statute-because the prejudice is
reflected in the objectively defined categories that people use when they
talk.
The majority rejected this argument, concluding that the dissents
23 8
effectively relabeled anticipated applications as original meaning.
Neither Kavanaugh nor Gorsuch, however, examined whether linguistic
categories can have the intersubjective character that originalism
demands of original public meaning and thus legitimate binding law.
This Subpart shows that Kavanaugh's position is inconsistent with
existing originalist principles. Part IV addresses whether his linguistic
categories approach could be incorporated into originalism/textualism to
help resolve the conflict between meaning and expectations.
i. Linguistic Categories Are Not Intersubjective
Kavanaugh presumably believes that interpreters can uncover the
existence of separate linguistic categories by observing how people talk,
a real-world referent on the truth of the existence of those categories.
The way fluent speakers of a language organize concepts is thus
this example suggests that Justice Alito believes either that teachers in heterosexual relationships are
capable of abstaining from sex before marriage in a way that those in a same-sex relationship
cannot, or he believes that those in same-sex relationships cannot be married.
236. Id. at 1751 (majority opinion). Drawing an analogy to the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), the Court explained that the parties argued that the ADA did not cover disabled prisoners
because Congress surely was not thinking of them in enacting the law. Nonetheless, the Court found
prisoners were covered by its plain language. Id.
237. Id. at 1753.
238. Id. at 1751.
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intersubjectively knowable. A court could then use that information to
conclude that the semantic meaning of sex discrimination does not
include sexual orientation discrimination.
The way people speak also differs from a lawmaker's views about
how a statute would apply. The legislator's anticipated applications are
subjective and extratextual. Unless members of the public were mind
readers, those governed by the law would have no access to a legislator's
individual views. By contrast, everyone who speaks the language knows
the linguistic categories. They are commonly understood. Any
reasonable reader of the text would understand them.
The problem, though, is that the objective nature of linguistic
categories does not read on how we understand the meaning of a clause,
the issue that originalism cares about. This is true because the way we
speak is not necessarily the way we comprehend the objective meaning
of a legal text.
For example, most people in 1789 assumed that a woman could not
be President of the United States. But that assumption read solely on the
subjective values of the time, not original meaning. To be sure, linguistic
patterns likely formed suggesting that a woman could never be the
president. People likely used the pronoun "he"-meaning a man-when
referring to future presidents. Those patterns could be objectively
observed through evidence of how people talked. But this manner of
speaking has virtually no bearing on whether the original meaning of the
Constitution's text permits either sex to become President. To answer
that, originalists look directly to the semantic meaning of the text, and
under it, women can be President. 239
Similarly, what most people in 1964 would have subjectively
believed about whether Title VII applied to sexual orientation or gender
identity discrimination says everything about the subjective prejudices
that much of the population held. From that pervasive prejudice, not
surprisingly, patterns of speaking developed. But those patterns were not
the meaning of Title VII any more than the way people spoke about
women Presidents in the 1790s was not the meaning of the Constitution.
Common parlance, to be sure, may provide insight into public
meaning. But that does not transform a text's meaning into how most
people talk. Meaning for the originalist is what a reasonable reader

239.

See John

O.

McGinnis, Martha Could Have Succeeded George, L. & LIBERTY (Nov. 2,

2015), https://lawliberty.org/martha-could-have-succeeded-george;

see also Robert Natelson, A

Woman as President?The Gender-Neutral Constitution, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2015, 10:56 AM),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/10/28/a-woman-as-presidentthe-gender-neutral-constitution (applying originalist analysis without assessing how most people
would have expected the Constitution to be applied).
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understands the text to mean. Once one gets into most people versus the
others, the analysis has crossed from intersubjective original public
meaning to widely held subjective expectations about how a statute
should be applied, that patterns of speaking objectively reflect these
expectations and cannot change that distinction.
Kavanaugh insists that the way people talk is relevant to a statute's
meaning.2 4 0 But the cases he cited do not support the interpretive move
he makes. In each case, the Court used the way people talked about a
statutory term to confirm the literal meaning from then-contemporary
dictionary definitions in the context of the entire statute. 241
For example, New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, dealt with a 1925 statute
using the phrase "contract of employment." 2 42 To uncover the public
meaning, the Court cited the context-the statute referred to "workers"
not employees-and contemporary "dictionaries [that] tended to treat
'employment' more or less as a synonym for 'work."' 243 From this, the
Court concluded that the original public meaning of the text included
contracts with both employees and independent contractors. 244
Nothing in the Court's analysis comes close to what Kavanaugh
proposes-using common parlance to infer an exclusion from the literal
meaning of the text.24 s In sum, common parlance can helpfully reveal
meaning when the text is vague or ambiguous. When the text is clear,
though, the only purpose served by looking to how people speak would
be to reveal something beyond the public meaning-namely, how those
speakers expected that the statute would be applied given their own
subjective values.
ii. Harassment Is a Distinct Linguistic Category and Sex
Discrimination
The harassment cases also compel the rejection of Kavanaugh's
linguistic category approach. In the mid-1960s, most people would
likely have characterized discriminating because of sex differently from
240. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1828 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
241. Id. The four cases that Kavanaugh cites all use common parlance to confirm the literal
meaning of the text in context, not to create an extratextual exception. See New Prime Inc. v.

Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539-40 (2019) (using common parlance and legal authorities to confirm
dictionary definitions); Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1722 (2017)
(referring to a conversation between friends only to confirm the literal meaning of the text); wisc.
Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2070-71 (2018); FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397,
403-05 (2011) (confirming dictionary definition of "personal").
242. New PrimeInc., 139 S. Ct. at 539-40 (internal quotation marks omitted).
243. Id. at 535, 540-41.
244. Id. at 540-41.
245. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1825 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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harassing an employee.24 6 Only "linguistic happenstance" causes us to
have a common colloquial term for homosexual individuals but not for
people harassed at work.247 If anything, harassment is more
linguistically distinct from sex discrimination and sexual orientation or
gender identity discrimination.
The concept of workplace sex discrimination involves treating
someone as less capable of doing a job or as inappropriate for the work
environment because of their sex. It embodies stereotypes about
competence, strength, and workplace atmosphere. Essentially, employers
discriminate against women because of sex when they base a negative
employment decision on traits widely associated with womanhood rather
than a particular woman's ability to do the job. Referring to the Court's
1950s stereotype hypothetical, an employer might explain: "[W]omen
can't be mechanics. They aren't strong enough, and they don't like
getting their hands dirty."24
Harassment, by contrast, involves mistreating someone for reasons
going beyond those stereotypes. Unlike discrimination narrowly defined,
a woman acting in a stereotypical, woman-like fashion generally does
not provide a reason to harass her. While some women might be
harassed for stereotypical reasons, harassment is more commonly
triggered when a woman acts in ways that the employer finds
unwomanly. For example, prime candidates for harassment are female
employees who find a supervisor's romantic advances unwelcome or act
in a way that the supervisor thinks is inappropriate for her sex. In short,
whereas employers tended to discriminate against women for being
women, they tended to harass women for acting in ways that the
employer thought a woman should not act.
Similarly, prior to the late 1990s, people characterized
male-on-male mistreatment as hazing or bullying, concepts quite distinct
from sex discrimination. 249 Statutes and other codes of conduct address
hazing and bullying in contexts having no connection to sex
discrimination. 2 s1 Harassment and sex discrimination thus had their own

246. Koppelman, supra note 164, at 12, 16-17 (explaining that harassment could be in a
separate linguistic category from sex discrimination called "persons sexually harassed at work").
247. Id. (noting that the existence of a colloquial term for those discriminated against, such as
"mothers" did not stop the Court from holding that such discrimination also constituted sex
discrimination).
248. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1748-49.
249. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
250. Claire Wilkinson, Workplace Hazing Emerges from the Shadows, BUS. INS. (Sept. 3,
2019), https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20190903/NEwS06/912330439/Workplacehazin
g-emerges-from-the-shadows# (discussing potential liability for hazing in the workplace); Lisa
Nagele-Piazza,

Workplace Bullying and Harassment. What's the Difference?, SHRM (Mar. 28,
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distinct linguistic categories. Yet, the Court has held unanimously that
harassment against men or women is nonetheless sex discrimination. 21
The dissenting Justices, of course, denied this distinction between
harassment and discrimination. 252 They maintained that even
male-on-male mistreatment fits within the sex discrimination
category. 253 Let's consider that point with some care. Firing someone
because they are a woman and firing them because they are gay, the
dissent contends, "implicates two distinct societal concerns, reveals two
distinct biases, imposes two distinct harms, and falls within two distinct
statutory prohibitions." 254 But harassing someone because they are a
man who displays traits viewed as unmanly is entirely different. In
Kavanaugh's words, whether an employee is male or female, "harassing
[them] because of [their] sex is discriminating against the employee
because of [their] sex. "25
Any distinction along these lines is one of degree, not kind. 2 56
Picking on an effeminate man does not bring to my mind the concept of
sex discrimination. At least not before the Supreme Court held that it
was. 25 7 Prior to that, I would likely have used the concepts of hazing or
bullying. Yet now, I have no trouble conceptualizing harassment as sex
discrimination.
Conversely, it seems obvious to me that an unfavorable
employment decision resting on prejudice against a homosexual or
transgender person is sex discrimination. At the least, these types of
discrimination strike me as more tightly bound up with sex
discrimination than male-on-male harassment. The reasons for harassing
vary widely from case to case. But an employer discriminates against
someone for being sexually attracted to men, or dressing like a woman,
only if the employee is a man. It's no different than discriminating

&

2018), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-compliance/state-and-local-updates/pag
es/workplace-bullying.aspx (discussing state anti-workplace bullying laws); Laws, Policies

Regulations, STOPBULLYING.GOV, https://www.stopbullying.gov/resources/laws (last visited Feb. 8,

2021) (detailing state anti-bullying laws).
251. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75, 79.
252. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1834-35 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 1834.
254. Id. at 1835.
255. Id. at 1834-35.
256.

Andrew

Koppelman has made the point that any deviation "from the behavior

traditionally deemed appropriate for one's sex is the imputation of homosexuality." Andrew
Koppelman, Why DiscriminationAgainst Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U.

L. REv. 197, 235 (1994). As a result, if sexual orientation discrimination were not sex
discrimination, virtually any sophisticated defendant could escape liability by arguing that it did not
discriminate because of a man's or woman's biological sex, but because the employee's actions in

the circumstances led the employer to believe that they were gay.
257. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1754.
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against a woman for acting too masculine or a man for acting too
feminine. Indeed, had the dissent prevailed, one can imagine employers
arguing, "I didn't fire her for acting too masculine, I fired her because I
thought she was gay."2"8
My opinion, of course, is irrelevant to Title VII's 1964 meaning (or
25 9
And it
its as amended meaning). But so are Kavanaugh's and Alito's.
is hard to see how our disagreement rests on anything firmer than
subjective disagreement rather than the intersubjective understanding
necessary for original public meaning.2 61
IV.

ORIGINALISM, BOSTOCK, AND THE FACT-VALUE

DICHOTOMY

In Bostock, all agreed that prejudice that we now recognize as
illegitimate produced a prevailing view in 1964 that Title VII's
261
But
protections did not extend to gay and transgender individuals.

258. Koppelman, supra note 256, at 235-37.
259. Kavanaugh's discussion of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) confirms
that linguistic categories do not establish original public meaning. "[T]he question [in Brown]," he
acknowledges, "was what equal protection meant," i.e., its original public meaning. Bostock, 140 S.
Ct. at 1835 n.10 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). Substantial post-enactment evidence existed of
legislators (including Congress) using language conveying the concept that separate facilities could
be equal and thus consistent with the equal protection requirement, and courts upheld those laws for
decades. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896) ("Laws permitting, and even
requiring, ... separation [of the races] . . have been generally, if not universally, recognized as
within the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their police power. The most
common instance of this is connected with the establishment of separate schools for white and
colored children, which have been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts
of states [such as Massachusetts] where the political rights of the colored race have been longest and
most earnestly enforced."). In common parlance, people spoke of differing facilities for different
races as sufficiently equal.
Yet, Kavanaugh concluded that the Court correctly held that despite all these statutes and
judicial decisions, the original public meaning of the equal protection clause included the concept
that "[s]eparate but equal is not equal." Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1835 n.10 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
In assessing Brown, Kavanaugh in a properly originalist fashion, looks to the 1860s objective public
meaning of "equal protection of the laws" untainted by then prevalent subjective values and
prejudices that likely would have led reasonable people at that time to expect that separate but equal
facilities could be consistent with the text. In doing so, he properly ignores the wealth of
post-enactment evidence indicating that most people in the 1860s likely thought that separate could
very well be equal. Yet, when the question is what discriminate because of sex means, similar
post-enactment evidence, for Kavanaugh, becomes determinative. He never explains how the
post-enactment evidence differed in the two cases.
260. One might argue that my views are colored by the time in which I live and do not reflect
the way people would have spoken in the early 1960s. But neither of the dissenters claimed that
anything had changed between 1964 and now with respect to how we speak or categorize these
various types of discrimination. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1758 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 1828,
1835 n.10 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
261. See id. at 1749-51 (majority opinion).
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nothing in the text reflected that prejudice. The text excluded many
262
things from the act's scope, but nothing related to these groups.
In 1964 (and certainly when Congress amended Title VII), not
everyone felt this prejudice. Millions of gay and transgender individuals,
and the people who knew and loved them, surely didn't. Using
conventional categorization, this prejudice thus rested on a subjective
value, not an objective fact. To rely on such an extratextual subjective
expectation about how Title VII should apply would, from an originalist
perspective, wrongly elevate anticipated applications to the status of
binding law. From an originalist perspective, the Bostock majority got it

right.
But from an originalist perspective, the Court got it wrong, too.
Ignoring the way most people at the time would have understood the text
in favor of an interpretation that just so happened to line up precisely
with the Justices' own modem values is not just bad originalism, but
anti-originalism. 263
The dissenting Justices, though, were also right and wrong. They
restrained themselves from imposing their own values only by flouting
the centrality of intersubjective semantic meaning and improperly
elevating extratextual, contested, subjective prejudices to the status of

binding law.
Originalism/textualism produces these conflicting outcomes
because it rests on a false dichotomy between facts and values. The
method assumes that thought divides into distinct categories:
(1) objectively verifiable facts that determine intersubjective semantic
meaning, and (2) entirely subjective values that constitute individuating
expectations. Objective facts establish the semantic meaning of a
statute's text and fix that meaning for future interpreters. Subjective
values enhance the understanding of the text for each individual, but that
subjective meaning is applicative, not semantic, and is not fixed.

262. For example, Title VII recognizes exemptions for: (1) employment outside the United
States and for religious groups, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a); (2) where bona fide occupational
qualifications require an employee to be of a particular sex or religion, § 2000e-2(e); (3) where
national security interests required as such, § 2000e-2(g); and (4) giving preference to Native
Americans near reservations, § 2000e-2(i).
263. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 60, at 381 ("[I]t is a little difficult to see what is left of
a recognizable originalism . .. if social movements have such substantial discretion to apply
constitutional provisions as they see fit. To put the point differently, why would one adopt a fixed
constitution if it can be changed so easily by social movements?").
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Yet, we inherently recognize that what we take to be facts are not
always provable with certainty by external referents. 2" And what we
understand as values are not wholly subjective; often we can determine
whether a value is right or wrong with a high degree of consensus. This
inherent understanding of the relative objectivity of some values seems
to be the point driving the dissenters and the originalist commentators
who have objected to the Bostock decision. For them, the prejudice of
the early 1960s feels as objective to the mid-1960s populace as any other
component of the meaning of discriminationbecause of sex. To ignore it
as a mere subjective expectation wrongly opens the interpretive window
to modern learning.
If fact and value exist on a continuum, we may need to think about
originalism in a different way to overcome the conflict that Bostock
revealed. The following Subparts expand on the fact-value dichotomy
and examine two originalist approaches for avoiding the conflict
between meaning and expectations by abandoning the false
dichotomy. 26
The first Subpart expands on Kavanaugh's use of linguistic
categories as a substitute for direct access to an intersubjective original
understanding. If the focus on the way people talk can provide a
sufficiently definitive basis for creating binding law, originalism could
comfortably find that Title VII did not prohibit sexual orientation or
gender identity discrimination despite the subjective nature of the
prejudice driving the prevailing view. This approach ultimately fails
because the way we talk is not a sufficient ground to bind future
generations to what amounts to unwritten law.2 6
The second Subpart draws upon examples that originalist scholars
have used to empower an interpreting court to reject beliefs that the
public firmly held at the time a law was enacted if those beliefs rested on
a mistake of objective fact. These scholars reject the notion that
interpreting courts could use changes in values similarly to open the
interpretive window. But if the line between facts and values is actually
a hazy one, that distinction needs to be reexamined.2 67

264.

See Mark Kelman, The Necessary Myth of Objective Causation Judgments in Liberal

PoliticalTheory, 63 CHI-KENT L. REV. 579, 620, 628-29, 631, 636 (1987) (arguing that causation
decisions cannot be made objectively, and that ultimately subjective judgment is required).
265. See infra Part IV.A-C.
266. See infra Part IVB.
267. See infra note 307 and accompanying text.
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Originalismand the Fact-ValueDichotomy

Originalism rests on the belief that the way we think can be broken
down into separate realms of (1) intersubjective facts that one can prove
true with reference to an objective real world, and (2) individuating
values that are entirely subjective with no referent outside the individual
who holds them. 268
Originalism claims to provide a method to interpret meaning
without looking to subjective values. 269 Public meaning is a fact. It can
be discovered with reference to information that all reasonable people
would agree is true based on an objective referent. Lexicographers draft
dictionary definitions with reference to how words are used, not by what
they think a word should mean. 270 The process is intersubjective and
thus the optimal source of evidence about meaning for the originalist.
Expectations about how a statute will apply, by contrast, are
subjective beliefs that differ from person to person. Though it is possible
that most or even all reasonable people will hold the same value with
respect to a particular law, no neutral referent can confirm its validity.
Each person must choose to have a value, or not.
A legislature can effectively convert a value into a fact by explicitly
recognizing it in a statute's text. 271 Whether contract workers and
employees should receive the same level of benefits turns on a
subjective value. A statute that requires an employer to provide equal
benefits to both groups turns that social value into a legal fact that all
reasonable readers will understand, even if they don't agree with it. But
if the legislature leaves the text vague, no individual or group of
individuals' values can definitively fix the meaning of the vague term.
Only the legislature has that power.
A statute that reads, for example, "education systems with single
sex schools must have the same financial resources devoted to teacher
salaries in male and female schools" converts a value relating salary to
instructional quality into a semantic fact. But a statute that reads,
"educational systems with single sex schools must appropriate resources
in a fair way between male and female schools," does not have a fixed
meaning for fluent English speakers that teacher salaries must be the
268. Whittington, supra note 11, at 600-03, 609.
269. Colby & Smith, supra note 11, at 294-95.
270.

See Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understandingin the History of ConstitutionalIdeas: The

Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 741-42 (2013).
271. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLuM. L. REV. 1,
107-08 (2001) ("If a majority in Congress prefers to pursue precise legislative policies, it can enact
detailed and specific statutes, increasing its ability to control discretion in the application of its
commands .... ").

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2021

47

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 4

424

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:377

same, even if most people at the time the legislature enacted the statute
believed that fairness required an equal distribution of teacher-wage
resources. The legislature could have, but did not, choose words to
convey a clear message about salaries. Since it did not, no one's
subjective beliefs about the appropriate distribution of wage resources
can lock in the statute's meaning.
If this fact-value dichotomy is false, and value-free historical facts
do not exist-or are insufficiently robust to support coherent meaningthen the semantic meaning in the context that originalists seek becomes
allusive. One could not understand the meaning without taking account
of the values motivating the use of the language in a particular way.
Semantic meaning would lose its contextual grounding and become a
matter of convention about how words are used.272 It could tell us only
the meaning of words disassociated from how the legislature intended
them. That type of meaning could not answer real interpretive
questions.27 3 It would leave out the critical step-and here's how
members of the public at the time the statute was enacted understoodthe
manner in which those words would be used to respond to the particular
problem we now face.

272. This limited version of semantic meaning outside the fact-value dichotomy may have
been what Whittington had in mind when he referred to "semantic originalism" as an "oxymoron."
wHITTINGTON, supra note 48, at 287 n.75; id. at 185 ("Yet semantics is ultimately of limited use in
interpreting specific texts. The role of semantics is to analyze the nature of language in the abstract;
however, actual communication occurs not at the level of abstract language but at the level of
specific, intended utterances. In the latter case, the question of whether a term is meant to be used in
accord with its conventional sense is a specific one and turns on the intentions of the speaker.").
A truly intersubjective semantic meaning would not be enough to meaningfully guide
future decisions. See Steven Mailloux, Interpretation,in CRITICAL TERMS FOR LITERARY STUDY

121, 133-34 (Frank Lentricchia & Thomas McLaughlin eds., 2d ed. 1995) ("Interpretive theories are
not foundational but rhetorical, establishing no permanent grounding or guiding principles
guaranteeing correct interpretationbut certainly providing much rhetorical substance for interpretive
debate.... we are always arguing at particular moments in specific places to certain audiences. Our
beliefs and commitments are no less real because they are historical, and the same holds for our
interpretations. If no foundationalist theory will resolve disagreements over poems or treaties, we
must always argue our cases. In fact, that is all we can ever do."). The interpreter perceives
guidance from that meaning only because bound up with it are unperceived value-laden assumptions
and suppositions about how meaning applies to particular problems. To say the focus must be on
semantic and not applicative meaning is either: (1) to say nothing-because the meaning we find
can't answer any real questions-or (2) to read tacitly a possible applicative meaning into the
semantic meaning.
If the goal is to identify a fixed core of statutory meaning that would have been
understood by the citizens at the time and can guide future interpreters, an explicit focus on
value-laden action is more likely to produce an interpretation free of modem values than a pure
semantic originalism driven by tacitly assumed hidden values.
273. In Saul Cornell's words, "[t]o analyze Gricean sentence meaning historically one would
need to look at how patterns of usage correlated with patterns of intentionality at a given historical
moment." Cornell, supra note 270, at 734.
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An originalist method would remain possible without a strict
fact-value dichotomy. To re-ground semantic meaning, though, the
method would have to acknowledge that values are not entirely
subjective. They can be uncovered-meaningfully debated leading to a
decision about their rightness-just as facts can. Assuming that a
coherent, value-free semantic meaning does not exist, an originalist must
seek to uncover the value structure from which the law arose by
examining the statute's text in light of those values.
Since values are on the table, modern values may threaten to infect
the analysis. But if the fact-value dichotomy is false, that risk cannot be
completely avoided. And by revealing the necessity of considering both
fact and value, we may increase the likelihood that courts will reveal the
better angels of their nature as they interpret statutes according to an
original public meaning that is not entirely intersubjective.
B.

Linguistic Categoriesas Intersubjective Meaning

Justice Kavanaugh sought to shift the originalist focus away from
inherently subjective beliefs people had about sexual orientation to the
way people talked about it.274 Whether he saw it in these terms, his
interpretive move can be understood as an effort to enable originalism to
come to grips with our inherent understanding that values can be
objective. This Subpart flushes out this take on his analysis.
The way people talk is different from the way they think. The early
complaints that the majority cited revealed that some people in the
mid-1960s believed that sex discrimination included sexual orientation
discrimination. 27 Those conflicting opinions could not be proven
definitively right or wrong. Kavanaugh's interpretive move shifts the
point of focus away from these contested beliefs about what Title VII
meant to our objective understandings of how we talk about those
contested beliefs.
Linguistic categories form, Kavanaugh recognized, and any fluent
speaker of the language will understand them. 276 It does not matter what
particular individuals believe. They understand the categories necessary
to communicate and that can be objectively confirmed. Just as a statute's
text may convey an intersubjective meaning even though it incorporates
values that not everyone agrees with, everyone does not need to agree
with our linguistic categories in order to understand them. If people

274. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1825, 1828 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting).
275. See id. at 1750-51 (majority opinion).
276. See id. at 1833 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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actually employ two distinct categories when talking about sex
discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination, Kavanaugh argues,
a sufficiently intersubjective meaning of the text of Title VII would
justify excluding sexual orientation discrimination. 2 77 This move would
make values more like facts, preserving the originalist justification for
establishing binding law despite reliance on a value not directly fixed by
the text.
For this distinction to work within the originalist method, the
process of forming the linguistic categories would have to be
intersubjective, at least to the extent that a lexicographer
intersubjectively writes the dictionary. Almost surely, though, linguistic
categories cannot meet this standard. To speak a language is to classify.
Although the existence of categories is a discoverable fact about how a
language is spoken, nothing inherently objective dictates how the
categories form. The lines between categories are functional. They
facilitate communication, enabling us to understand one another. But
they are not dictated by natural qualities of the outside world.
Reasonable people can thus disagree about where the lines between
linguistic categories should be drawn. They are thus often, if not always,
a product of our values, desires, and prejudices, rather than part of the
objective semantic meaning of the words we use. All categories that a
language uses to describe reality are thus purposive, what Mark Kelman
describes as "creatures of our own interests in naming."2 7 8
Words like ball or block have real-world referents that enable their
meanings to be intersubjective. But categorizing people into different
races, for example, does not have a value-free referent. People know the
categories, but whether the distinction between them is true remains
subjective. Is knowing enough when a statute's text includes
controversial material? Or does there have to be some level of consensus
that the categories reflect the right meaning before we can rely on them

to establish binding law?

277. Id. at 1827-30.
278.

KELMAN, supra note 87, at 64; ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS

32-33 (1975) ("[A] fact becomes what it is for us because of the way we categorize it."). If things in
the world have intelligible essences that individuals may comprehend separate from language,
objective agreement may be possible. But the possibility of intelligible essences has been largely
rejected in modern philosophy. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 463-65 (J. C. A. Gaskin
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1651); 2 JOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC: RATIOCINATIVE
AND INDUCTIVE 123-27 (9th ed. 1875); 3 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 293-306

(L. A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1951) (1888). And even if some intelligible essences
exist, a theory like originalism that rests on language as a means to avoid the problem of subjective
values could not directly access an objective essence.
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In Bostock, the prejudices against homosexual and transgender
persons that dominated the public view in 1964 and long afterward
played a central role in creating the separate linguistic concepts that the
dissenters describe. 279 Given that we now know that sexual orientation
and gender identity are not legitimate bases on which to discriminate in
employment, 280 the development of these distinct linguistic categories
merely confirms the role of then-dominant prejudices in creating them.
People will talk about something that is abhorred differently than
they will talk about something more acceptable, and they may continue
to use that distinguishing language even after the once abhorred practice
has become more widely accepted.
By 1964, the idea of equality in the workplace between men and
women was contested, but not an abhorrent concept. It certainly wasn't
always that way. For a half century after the ratification of the
Constitution, a woman could not hold a job that required a license or a
college degree. 281 In the 1870s, the Supreme Court upheld a state's
decision to prohibit women from practicing law. 282 And into the 1960s,
many of the nation's leading colleges did not admit females. 2 83
Language reflected these practices. People would say female
professor but not female pre-school teacher, for example. But many
women surely did not view themselves through the categorical lens that
common parlance gave us. Yet, our laws suggested women were a
certain way, and our language followed suit.
And even now, though women are on equal footing legally, we
often speak of them in ways that recur to the old categories. I know
multiple couples whose parents, upon learning that the wife planned to
keep her last name, asked whether that was legal. Recently, someone

279. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1755, 1769-71 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("[T]he concept of
discrimination because of 'sex' is different from discrimination because of 'sexual orientation' or
'gender identity."'); id. at 1833 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) ("[A]ll of the usual indicators of
ordinary meaning ... overwhelmingly establish that sexual orientation discrimination is distinct
from, and not a form of, sex discrimination.").
280. See id. at 1741 (majority opinion) ("An individual's homosexuality or transgender status
is not relevant to employment decisions."); see also id. at 1769-71 (Alito, J., dissenting) (agreeing
with the majority); id. at 1823 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority).
281. Marylynn Salmon, The Legal Status of Women, 1776-1830, GILDER LEHIRMAN,
https://ap.gilderlehrman.org/essay/legal-status-women-177686"1830 (last visited Feb. 8, 2021).
282. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 137-39 (1872) (holding that no provision of the federal
Constitution prohibited a state from refusing to allow women to practice law); id. at 141 (Bradley,
J., concurring) ("The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.").
283. Scott Jaschik, 'Keep the Damned Women Out,' INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 30, 2016),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/09/30/author-discusses-new-history-struggle-elite-univ
ersities-admit-women.
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84
told me that they had a "male nurse" when they were in the hospital. 2
When a woman achieves a certain goal, we still sometimes reflexively
speak of it as if her biological sex were somehow noteworthy. There
remains a sense in the way we talk that still reflects that women are
categorically different from men in their ability to hold public office, for
example, even though we know that they are not.
Homosexual and transgender persons experienced a similar
trajectory. In 1964, few would have imagined a law protecting members
of these groups in the workplace, just as 150 years before, few would
have imagined such a law for women. But many homosexual and
transgender persons, and those who knew and loved them, likely had
entirely different views about whether the text of Title VII applied to
protect them from workplace discrimination.
As of 2021, homosexual and transgender persons have made
substantial gains just as cis women did before them.285 But as with
women, the way we talk changes more slowly than the way we think. It
is common for people who are part of once disfavored groups to say that
even though they now have equal rights, they long for the day when their
status is accepted to the extent that no one thinks about it. Values change
slowly; linguistic categories change slower still. Neither can be used to
convert a vague statutory text into legitimate binding law consistent with
the principles that justify the originalist/textualist method.
A legislature has the authority to make a contested value fixed
binding law even if not everyone agrees with that decision. But a court
does not have the authority to turn linguistic patterns that originally
flowed from anachronistic laws into continuing sources of binding law.

C.

Treating Values More Like Facts

Originalists acknowledge that an interpretive court may correct
mistakes of objective fact without undermining the originalist/textualist
method. 286 Where only values change, however, these originalists insist
that the interpreting court must retain the original meaning even if
modern values are undeniably different. 287 The interpretive window may
open to correct factual mistakes, but not to implement evolving values.

284. See, e.g., Niall O'Donnell, What's the Word for a Male Nurse?, ENGLISH-LANGUAGE
THOUGHTS (Nov. 9, 2017), https://englishlanguagethoughts.com/2017/11/09/whats-the-word-for-amale-nurse.
285. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737.
286. See Berman, supra note 74, at 385.
287. See Colby & Smith, supra note 11, at 248-49, 264; see also McGinnis & Rappaport, supra
note 49, at 389-90.
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To illustrate, Solum posits hypothetical punishment X that was not
thought to be cruel when the Eighth Amendment was ratified.288 At that
2 89
At
time, people mistakenly believed that punishment X was painless.
a later time, we learned that punishment X inflicts "horrendous pain. "290
Solum contends that in this situation "the applicative meaning of cruel
could change while the linguistic meaning remained the same." 291
But the result would be different if a value had changed rather than
a fact. Now, assume that punishment X was indeed painless for the
recipient, but the manner in which the punishment was inflicted brought
great shame on the victim's family. When the clause was enacted, the
prevailing view found such shaming appropriate. But modern values
recognize that shaming a criminal's family for the criminal's acts
inappropriately punishes innocent people. 292 Because this hypothetical
reflects a change in values about correct policy, rather than an objective
fact, an interpreting court could not hold consistently with the originalist
method that punishment X is cruel.
McGinnis and Rappaport offer a similar example.2 93 They posit a
hypothetical in which miners discover mineral deposits that, during the
founding era, everyone believed to be gold. 294 Pursuant to the
Constitution, a state makes coins from this mineral. 29 Later scientific
learning reveals that these deposits looked like gold, but had certain
qualities making them less valuable. The authors recognize that
originalism would permit an interpreting court in a case challenging the
use of this mineral for coins to recognize that the substance was not in
fact gold, even though a reasonable reader of the Constitution during the
founding era would have thought that it was.296
The authors stress, however, that the result would be different if
values about appropriate coinage policy had changed. 297 In the false-gold
hypothetical, they point out, an interpreter would recognize "as a factual
matter" that people who thought the mineral was gold must have "been
mistaken." 2 98 McGinnis and Rappaport contrast this sort of mistake with

288. Solum, supra note 11, at 65-66, 85.
289. Id. at 65-66.
290. Id. at 66.
291. Id.
292. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (punishing an individual for a status
over which the individual has no control would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
293. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 60, at 380.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
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"a legal provision purport[ing] to incorporate moral or policy beliefs."2 99
These types of beliefs are not factual, and thus if understandings about
how they should apply change from the time that they are adopted to the
time they are interpreted, "it is more likely that later interpreters are
mistaken about the content of the provision that was adopted than that
interpreters at the time were mistaken about the meaning of the
provisions they wrote." 300
To illustrate this distinction, assume that at some point after the
founding era, the public came to believe that because gold and silver
were used to make jewelry, they should not be used for coinage. The
new prevailing view held that equally valuable elements with more
industrial uses were more appropriate for financial exchanges than gold
or silver. Because this change is one of policy and the values that
underlie it, rather than fact, a court could not interpret the constitutional
language to permit the use of other equally valuable minerals for
coinage. 30 1
Putting these examples in the context of Title VII, a reasonable
reader would have understood the text to prohibit all sex-based
discrimination. But adverse workplace decisions against homosexual
and transgender persons, under the then-prevailing view, were not
discrimination. Just as the public believed punishment X was painless
and the false-gold deposits were actually gold, in 1964 the public
believed that homosexual and transgender individuals were, in a sense,
unqualified. According to medical literature, they suffered from a mental
disorder and practices commonly associated with them were often
punishable as felonies. 302 Just as a physically disabled woman, or one
actively engaged in criminal activity, would be unqualified to perform
certain jobs, homosexual and transgender persons, under the 1964
prevailing view, were unqualified.
Just as we learned that punishment X caused horrendous pain and
false gold was not gold, we now know that homosexual and transgender
people do not suffer from a mental disorder, nor do they regularly

299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Scalia made this point explicitly, arguing that the Eighth Amendment does not abstract "a
moral principle of 'cruelty' that philosophers can play with in the future, but rather the existing
society's assessment of what is cruel." Balkin, supra note 38, at 295-96. Originalists often insist that
meaning includes the particular conceptions people had at the time of enactment. See id.; McGinnis
& Rappaport, supranote 60, at 378-79; Solum, supra note 11, at 20; WHITTINGTON, supra note 48,
at 184-85.
302. Sarah Carr & Helen Spandler, Hidden from History? A Brief Modern History of the
Psychiatric "Treatment" of Lesbian and Bisexual Women in England, LANCET (Feb. 11, 2019),

https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdflpii=S2215-0366%2819%2930059-8.
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commit crimes. An individual's status as a member of these groups does
not disqualify them from any employment opportunity. Adverse
workplace decisions based on sexual orientation or gender identity thus
do constitute discrimination, and that discrimination turns on the sex of
the individual. Identifying as a man and being sexually attracted to
women is only a problem for female employees.
If our modern understanding of sexual orientation and gender
identity evolved in a way that was similar to a society's learning that a
particular punishment once thought to be painless is actually
horrendously painful-or that a substance once thought to be gold was
not-originalism would permit an interpreter to take account of the
change. But if our modern understanding of sexual orientation and
gender identity arose from a change in values, then, according to the
originalist scholars, an interpreting court must keep the interpretive
window closed.
Given that the consensus among initially commentating originalists
seems to be that the Bostock majority was wrong, they presumably see
30 3
But fact-value
the change as one of value, not objective fact.
dichotomy is not robust enough to support that position.
All punishment incorporates some type of pain, physical or mental.
And all metals have some level of value. Whether a punishment falls
into the category of acceptable punishments, or false gold has
insufficient value to be used as coinage, are not value-free decisions.
What we mean by an acceptable level of pain or a sufficient monetary
value is thus not separable from the values we hold. The two are bound
up together. We simply cannot know as a matter of indisputable,
intersubjective, historical fact the level of pain equating to cruelty or the
value metal must have to be acceptable for coinage (or to constitute gold
given a similar appearance).
Critically, though, we can know more about shared values than the
traditional fact-value dichotomy suggests. Solum, McGinnis, and
30 4
Despite the
Rappaport tacitly recognize this in their hypotheticals.
value-laden nature of the questions, we are not hopelessly ignorant about
how much pain constitutes an unconstitutionally cruel punishment or
how much value is sufficient for a metal to be used for coinage.
Although some sadists might not agree that horrendous pain would be
unconstitutionally cruel, Solum concludes-and I agree-that American
society would share the value that any punishment falling into the

303.
304.

See Blackman, supranote 6.
See supra notes 288-300 and accompanying text.
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category we have named horrendous would be unconstitutional. 305
Similarly, a broad consensus may be available to conclude that a mineral
that looked like gold but had substantially less value, did not constitute
gold for coinage purposes.
To frame these issues in a way that produced an objective answer
with a definitive real-world referent, one would need to artificially
narrow the question to the point that it does not include the information
we need to interpret the law.3 06 For example, one might argue that we
can know objectively that a mineral is not gold because we could test it
and determine its atomic weight. The answer to that question may be
objective, albeit based on a fact unknown to the framers of the
Constitution. But it does not capture the full range of information needed
to determine whether the mineral should be used for money in the sense
that the word "gold" was objectively intended by the framers. We need
to consider contested matters-whether we call them facts or valuesbut we can nonetheless be quite confident in the result.
The label assigned to a change in prevailing views-mistake of fact
or evolving value-is thus itself a subjective decision. The proper
question is whether the change is sufficiently definitive that interpreting
courts can recognize and adopt it with the sort of intersubjectivequality
that we normally associate with semantic meaning.30 ? To be sure, in
some cases where societal values change, the definitiveness standard
would not be met. In such cases, original values-not modern onesshould guide interpretation. But when values do evolve in a definitive
way, an interpreting court should recognize it without the distorting lens
of an artificial fact-value label. Adopting the label is really making the
definitiveness decision without admitting it.
An alternative way to think about this issue can be derived from
what Lawrence Lessig called two-step originalism. 308 He pointed out
that a law's meaning is necessarily bound up with a set of
presuppositions.30 9 Within the philosophy of language, Gerald Graff
makes a similar point. 310 He explained that knowing a language means

305. See Solum, supra note 11, at 65-66.
306. ESKRIDGE, supra note 125, at 83 ("Text-based interpretation is not a mechanical exercise
that avoids value judgments.").
307. Koppelman, supra note 164, at 35-36 ("Sometimes prejudices are so deeply entrenched
that an entire society is mistaken about what its law actually is.").
308. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1165, 1183 (1993); LAWRENCE
LESSIG, FIDELITY & CONSTRAINT:
CONSTITUTION 63-64 (2019).

HOW THE SUPREME COURT HAS READ THE AMERICAN

309. Id. at 1211-14.
310.

See Gerald Graff, Determinacy/Indeterminacy,in CRITICAL TERMS FOR LITERARY STUDY

163, 164-67 (Frank Lentricchia & Thomas McLaughlin eds., 2d ed. 1995).
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more than learning the semantic meaning of words and the structure of
sentences: "[A] set of codes" exists separately from the words that
enable speakers to make "inferences about . .. situations or contexts in
which particular words and sentences tend to be used." 3 11 No one
actually sits around and watches grass grow. But we understand what it
means when someone says it. It is never really Christmas in July, but we
have sufficient coding to make sense of what a speaker means when they
use the phrase.
If we did not have these codes: "We would have no way of
inferring any intention and thus no way of deciding what any utterance
meant. Without the codes that enable us to determine the context, 'the
words on the page' of a text would tell us nothing." 312 We possess the
codes, in a sense, "unconsciously" and thus perceive that the words tell
us more than they actually do. 313
Recognizing the centrality of Graff's unconsciously internalized
codes
and
Lessig's
presuppositions
does
not undermine
originalism/textualism. The method takes account of context, which can
incorporate the codes and suppositions. The key point is that facts and
values overlap. Context lying beneath the text is nonetheless broadly and
intersubjectively held by reasonable readers. That was Kavanaugh's
point about linguistic categories.
If we are going to recognize the intersubjectivity of context-and
the codes and presuppositions that underlie it-we must also recognize
that codes/suppositions can change intersubjectively between the
enactment of a statute and when a court interprets it. We cannot dismiss
these changes as mere policy disputes over subjective values. The
correct question should be what the text would have meant to the
contemporary readers if they had had access to the modern codes and
presuppositions.
For example, the Eighth Amendment requires that fines, but not
prison sentences, be proportionate. 314 The text could not be clearer, and
contemporary readers would likely have understood it that way. But in
the late eighteenth century, the penitentiary system did not exist.3" The
founding generation likely presupposed that the relevant penal options
were fines and the death penalty. They did not have the linguistic codes
we have today that compel us to consider whether a length of time in
prison is appropriate for particular sets of crimes. That concept comes
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

Id. at 166.
Id.
See id. at 164-67.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
See Lessig, supra note 308, at 1204.
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into our minds without conscious effort because we are coded that way.
The founding generation was not. For them, only fines could
meaningfully be proportioned. 316
But if in 1792 prison sentences were the standard form of
punishment for serious crime, as they are now, a law requiring
proportional fines would have required the same for prison sentences. If
fines that do not deny an offender's liberty must meet this standard, then
surely a denial of liberty would as well.
Unless an interpreter engages this second step in determining the
original meaning, they are virtually certain to arrive at a meaning that
reasonable contemporary readers would not have understood had they
had modern codes and presuppositions. 317
A similar analysis can be applied to Title VII. In 1964,
homosexuality was believed to be a mental disorder and acts associated
with it were crimes. 318 The codes and presuppositions prevailing in 1964
would lead a reasonable reader to understand that the phrase
discrimination because of sex excluded adverse employment decisions
based on sexual orientation. Not because they weren't sufficiently
intertwined with sex, but because they weren't discrimination. In
context, it would have been obvious that Congress would not prohibit an
employer from refusing to hire someone with a mental disorder who was
probably regularly committing a felony. Despite the vagueness of the
concept of sex discrimination, in 1964 it would have made no sense to
anticipate that Title VII would protect homosexual and transgender
individuals from adverse workplace decisions based on their status as
members of these groups.
When viewed in this light, the majority's decision in Bostock poses
virtually no threat to the originalist tenet that changing values should not
change meaning. Our society generally understands, in a way that the
1964 society could not, that homosexuality and transgenderism are part
of the human condition. The Constitution prohibits criminalizing private
3 9
conduct associated with homosexual people 1 and guarantees a right for

316. See id. at 1186.
317. Id. at 1264 ("For reasons tied to how meaning changes across contexts, one-step
originalism as a practice must systematically defeat any ideal of fidelity. Blind to the effect of
context on meaning, originalism allows context to change constitutional meaning."). But some
originalist Justices have argued that prison sentences need not be proportionate because the text of
the Constitution does not require it. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965-67, 975 (1991)
(applying originalist reasoning to conclude that the Constitution does not require proportionality in
prison sentences); accord Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at
32 (Thomas, J., concurring).
318. See d'Silva, supranote 152.
319. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 575, 578 (2003).
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these people to marry someone of the same sex.3 20 The medical
now recognizes
that neither homosexuality
nor
community
transgenderism are disorders. 321 All nine Justices appeared to concur that
employers have no legitimate basis to discriminate generally against gay
or transgender persons.32 2 And members of both groups have definitively
demonstrated that they are productive members of society in every
conceivable way.
Viewed in this light, clinging to the values that most members of
the 1964 public held equates to continuing to treat false gold as if it were
real. The originalist tenet that judges must not substitute modern values
for original understanding rests on the notion that the changing whims of
evolving social movements should gain legal status only through the
democratic, as opposed to the judicial, process. But when values have
changed as definitively as any mistaken fact, that justification for
keeping the interpretive window closed evaporates. 323 The danger is no
longer that an anti-democratic court system will illegitimately impose
contested values, but that a dysfunctional or distracted legislature will
ignore the call of truth. Originalist scholars acknowledge that a court
may change a law's meaning because the original understanding was
infected with a mistake of objective fact. 32 4 Values can change no less
definitively. Refusing to recognize that would wrongly allow
extratextual assumptions-and ones we know to be definitively wrong at
that-to bind future generations.
V.

CONCLUSION

Two principal tenets of originalism/textualism-that modern values
may not supplant original meaning and that meaning is limited to the
intersubjective original understanding of the text-appear to conflict.
The scholarly originalist community's initial reaction to Bostock
suggests that the fear of modern values gaining hold through
anti-democratic means is the more important tenet. But given the
dramatic and definitive change in the prevailing views on homosexuality
320. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 U.S. 2584, 2601-02 (2015).
321. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1769 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing
medical literature indicating that in 1973 the medical community understood that homosexuality
was not a mental disorder).
322. See note 280 and accompanying text.
323. See id. at 1836-37 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
324. See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 357 (7th Cir. 2017) (Posner, J.,
concurring) (explaining that what Title VII's drafters and the 1964 public "understandably didn't
understand was how attitudes toward homosexual individuals would change in the following half
century.... We understand the words of Title VII differently not because we're smarter ... but
because we live in a different era, a different culture.").
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and gender identity between 1964 and today, the real threat appears to be
that unwritten prejudices of the past would be permitted to override
intersubjective meaning and illegitimately bind future generations.
Originalism must accept that values can be mistaken in the same
way as facts. The interpretive window should open to correct mistaken
values when they have changed in a way that is as definitive as what we
normally think of as a mistake of objective fact.
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